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ASSIMILATION, TOLERATION, AND THE STATE'S INTEREST
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE
Richard W. Gamett
Thirty-five years ago, in the context of a church-property dispute, Justice
William Brennan observed that government interpretation of religious doctrine
and judicial intervention in religious disputes are undesirable because, when
"civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies .... the hazards are
ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of
implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern." This
statement, at first, seems wise and fittingly cautious, even unremarkable and
obvious. On examination, though, it turns out to be intriguing, elusive, and
misleading. Indeed, Justice Brennan's warning presents "hazards" of its own,
and its premises-if uncritically embraced-can subtly distort our constitutional
discourse.
This Article provides a careful and close examination of the statement's
premises and implications, and concludes that, far from being a "purely
ecclesiastical concern," the content of religious doctrine and the trajectory of its
development are matters to which even a secular, liberal, and democratic
government will almost certainly attend. Governments like ours are not and
cannot be "neutral" with respect to religion's claims and content. As this Article
shows, the content, meaning, and implications of religious doctrine are and have
long been the subjects of government power and policy. Secular, liberal,
democratic governments like ours not only take cognizance of religion; they also
and in many ways seek to assimilate-that is, to transform-religious teaching.
And it is precisely because such governments do have an interest in the content,
and therefore in the "development," of religious doctrine-an interest that they
will, if permitted, quite understandably pursue-that authentic religious freedom
is so fragile.
* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful to the editors and staff of
the UCLA Law Review for inviting me to participate in their excellent Symposium, "Integration,
Difference, and Citizenship: Celebrating 50 Years of the UCLA Law Review," and also for their
assistance and patience in editing and publishing this Article. Three of my fellow participants in
this Symposium, Professors Andrew Koppelman, Kenneth Karst, and Alan Brownstein, generously
provided me with provocative criticism and helpful suggestions. I also appreciate the advice,
comments, and assistance provided by many friends and colleagues, including A.J. Bellia, Tricia
Bellia, Tom Berg, Patrick Brennan, Nicole Stelle Garnett, John Garvey, Steffen Johnson, John
Nagle, John Robinson, Bob Rodes, Andrew Sabl, Mark Sargent, Michael Scaperlanda, Greg Sisk,
Steve Smith, Howard Sklamberg, and Rob Vischer.
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INTRODUCTION
Thirty-five years ago, in the Hull Church' case, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment does not permit civil courts to
resolve church-property disputes involving "controversies over religious
doctrine and practice."2 Two Presbyterian churches in Savannah, Georgia
had decided to withdraw from the Presbyterian Church in the United
States,3 believing that the Church had departed from settled doctrine, fallen
into theological error, and generally been seduced by liberalism. After
Church officials moved to "take over the local churches' property... until
new local leadership could be appointed," the two local congregations
turned not to "higher church tribunals," but instead to the Superior Court
of Chatham County, Georgia.4 They filed separate suits "to enjoin the gen-
eral church from trespassing on the disputed property."5  Eventually, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, ruled that the
Constitution did not allow the Georgia courts to decide whether the Church
had violated its obligation under an implied state-law trust to "adhere to its
tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local
1. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (Hull Church).
2. Id. at 449.
3. The Presbyterian Church in the United States merged in 1983 with the United
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America to form the Presbyterian Church USA
(PCUSA). More information about the PCUSA is available at the Church's web site, at
http://www.pcusa.org.
There are a number of other Presbyterian churches in the United States, including the
Presbyterian Church in America (PCA), which, along with several other Presbyterian churches,
separated from the Presbyterian Church in the United States for reasons related to the latter
Church's theological and political liberalism. For more on the PCA, see the Church's web site, at
http://www.pcanet.org.
4. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 443.
5. Id.
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churches"6 or to "award church property on the basis of the interpretation
and significance the civil court assigns to aspects of church doctrine."7
I discuss in more detail below the ruling and reasoning in the Hull
Church case. Enough has been said already, though, to warrant the prelimi-
nary observation that the decision was archetypically, and perhaps even
trivially, correct. The Justices' conclusion seems reasonably consonant not
only with the relevant traditions and precedents,8 but also with appropriately
robust notions of religious freedom and limited government.9 Of course civil
courts should avoid venturing into disputes about the meaning and import of
religious teachings and claims, if only to avoid embarrassment. The subject
of this Article, however, is not the Hull Church Court's relatively
uncontroversial holding or its application of the well-settled "no religious
decisions" principle. '° It is, instead, Justice Brennan's passing observation
that government interpretation of religious doctrine and judicial intervention
in religious disputes are undesirable because when "civil courts undertake to
resolve [doctrinal] controversies ... the hazards are ever present of inhibiting
the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests
in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.""
At first, Brennan's statement, like the Hull Church decision itself,
seems wise and fittingly cautious, even unremarkable and obvious. 2  On
6. Id.
7. Id. at 441.
8. In my view, much of contemporary (that is, post-Everson v. Board of Education)
Establishment Clause doctrine reflects poorly that provision's history, purpose, and original meaning.
I believe that the Framers and ratifiers intended the Establishment Clause to disable the new federal
government from interfering with the religion-related decisions of the States' legislatures. See
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995). For other important studies, see, for example, GERARD V. BRADLEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR
COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998); JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000);
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of
Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church
and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1989) (suggesting that "church autonomy" is the "flagship issue of
church and state" and the "litmus test of a regime's commitment to genuine spiritual freedom").
10. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND POLICY
ARGUMENTS 826-40 (2001). Professor Tribe discusses this "principle" primarily under the heading
of the prohibition on "[e]xcessive [e]ntanglement" between government and religion. See LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1226,1231 (2d ed. 1988).
11. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
12. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in 5 PHILIP B.
KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 52 (1987). "[T]he power of civil
government relates only to ... civil interests, is confined to the care of the things of this world, and
hath nothing to do with the world to come." Id. at 53.
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examination, though, it is intriguing, elusive, and misleading. Although we
might be tempted to dismiss the remark as merely a stylistic flourish or casual
afterthought, it deserves and should inspire more in the way of analysis and
reflection: What, exactly, is Justice Brennan's concern, and what, precisely, is
his claim? What jurisprudential and theoretical work, if any, are the
descriptive, predictive, and normative components 3 of his statement
intended to do? What considerations inform, and what implications are
thought to follow from, judicial determinations that particular matters are
"purely ecclesiastical"? What is the "development of religious doctrine," and
what does it mean for such development to be "free"? 4 And what should we
make of the statement's internal tension? Although Justice Brennan
references two distinct "hazards," his cautionary note is fairly read as suggesting
that they are closely related, that is, that the content and "development of
religious doctrine" are "matter[s] of purely ecclesiastical concern," with respect
to which the government lacks any "secular interest[ ]."
This disclaimer of any such "interest" in matters of religious doctrine is
unsurprising, of course; it is of a piece with the "privatization" of religion in
liberal theory and in constitutional doctrine and rhetoric.'5 Religion and
politics alike are protected, it is said, by separating the public and private
spheres-the "garden" and the "wilderness," as Roger Williams memorably
put itl6 -and by rationalizing and secularizing the public while individu-
13. The descriptive claim is that doctrinal development is a "matter[] of purely
ecclesiastical concern," the predictive claim is that the resolution by civil courts of "[doctrinal]
controversies" threatens the "free development of religious doctrine," and the normative claim is
that doctrinal "development" ought to be "free." See Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
14. On the theological problem of doctrinal "development," see infra notes 119-121 and
accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) ("The Constitution decrees
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private
choice .... "); WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR
PHILOSOPHY xi (Dover Publications 1956) (1897) ("In this age of toleration, no [one] will ever
try actively to interfere with our religious faith, provided we enjoy it quietly with our friends and
do not make a public nuisance of it .. "); Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and
Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 978 (warning of the "great risk" that "religion,
far from being cherished, will be diminished, and that religious belief will ultimately become a
kind of hobby: something so private that it is as irrelevant to public life as the building of model
airplanes"); cf. Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 CATH. U.
L. REV. 19 (1991). See generally Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A "Privatization" Theory of the
Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275 (1986); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes,
Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).
16. See ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON'S LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND
ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE
AMERICAN TRADITION 89, 98 (1953); see also MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS 5-6 (1965) (quoting Williams).
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alizing, privatizing, and thereby safeguarding (and also, perhaps, domesti-
cating'7) the religious. At the same time, Justice Brennan's statement
suggests that religious "doctrine" does and should "develop[ I," that it should
develop "free[ly]," and that such development is itself a constitutional
desideratum.' The statement reflects-in Dean Garvey's words-an
"assum[ption] that 'the free development of religious doctrine' is something
the First Amendment wishes to promote."'9  It implies that government
ought not only to avoid "inhibiting" doctrinal development, but should also
aim to facilitate it, for the good of religion and the good of the polity, by
removing "inhibiti[ons]" imposed by others and perhaps also by creating
incentives for revision. 0
Far from being "purely ecclesiastical concerns," then, the content of
religious doctrine and the trajectory of its development might instead be matters
to which even a liberal, secular, and democratic state reasonably could, and
perhaps should, attend. Indeed, we are at present embroiled in any number of
academic and public discussions about what could fairly be characterized as efforts
by governments to prompt, facilitate, and direct the "development of religious
doctrine." These efforts include, for example, the proposed application of value-
shaping antidiscrimination laws to religious schools and service programs;"
calls in the wake of the Catholic Church's clergy-abuse scandal for
17. See Richard John Neuhaus, The Superficial in Pursuit of the Superficial, FIRST THINGS, Dec.
2003, at 65, 66 ("Religion in America has been unmanned, tamed, domesticated; it has been made
safe for liberal democracy."); cf. Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1089 (1998).
18. In the relevant paragraph, Justice Brennan twice in three sentences refers to "First
Amendment values" before offering his observation about the "hazards" of "inhibiting the free
development of religious doctrine." Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); see also TRIBE, supra
note 10, § 14-11, at 1233 (noting the "growing perception" in the United States "that both doctrinal
evolution and the autonomy of religious organizations were being stifled by judicial insistence that
original doctrine be retained without fundamental departure" (quoting C. ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN
CHURCH LAW § 251, at 238-39 (1933)); id. § 14-11, at 1235 ("The existence of dissidents is a
pervasive fact of religious life; their role within religious organizations can be the healthy one of
spurring continuing introspection and re-examination of doctrine.").
19. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 146 (1996) ("[This] is not self-evident.
Loosely translated, it means that heresy is a good thing. It may be, but not from the point of view of
the orthodox faithful." (citations omitted)); cf. TRIBE, supra note 10, § 14-11, at 1235 ("The
existence of dissidents is a pervasive fact of religious life; their role within religious organizations can
be the healthy one of spurring continuing introspection and re-examination of doctrine.").
20. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1466, 1468, 1472 (2003)
(arguing that law should "operationalize the New Enlightenment" by, among other things, "taking]
an affirmative role in promoting discourse" within religious communities, by promoting and
protecting those engaged in "cultural dissent," and by "piercing the veil that protects religious
authoritarianism from the processes of justice").
21. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[Elvery state law prohibiting discrimination is designed to replace prejudice with principle .... ").
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government supervision of how the Church trains its priests and whom it
ordains;2" California's refusal-which was validated recently by that state's
Supreme Court-to accommodate Catholic Charities' religiously grounded
objections to funding prescription contraceptives;23 and calls in both the popular
press24 and the academy25 for the United States to encourage and assist the
development and empowerment of "moderate" or "modem" voices in Islam.
I submit in this Article that Justice Brennan's warning presents "hazards"
of its own, and that its premises-if uncritically embraced-subtly distort our
constitutional discourse.26 The meaning, movement, and implications of
religious teachings are and have been both the subjects and objects of
government power and policy. In the end, government like ours are not, and
cannot be, "neutral" with respect to religion's claims.27 And it is precisely
because secular, liberal, democratic governments have an "interest" in the
content, and therefore in the "development," of religious doctrine-an interest
that such governments will, if permitted, quite understandably pursue-that
religious freedom is so fragile. Hull Church and cases like it are rightly decided,
and the "no religious decisions" rule is a good one, but both should rest on
firmer foundations-or, at least, on more candidly stated premises-than
distracting and disingenuous assurances that liberal governments do not care
what religious institutions, communities, and traditions teach.
This Article should enhance our conversations about religion and liber-
alism generally, and about "assimilation" and "toleration" more specifically.
22. See Harvey Silverglate, Pastors and Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2003, at A14
(noting Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas Reilly's view that the State "'must' play a
central role in dictating internal governance reforms that the church 'must' adopt").
23. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004). As
Justice Brown observed in dissent, several California legislators' statements suggest that the narrow
"religious employer" exemption from California's Women's Contraception Equity Act was crafted in
order to validate the view that "someone who practices artificial birth control can still be a good
Catholic" and to help the Catholic Church to recognize that "it's time to do the right thing." Id. at
103 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). But see id. at 78 (court majority insisting that "the
Legislature's motivation cannot reliably be inferred from a single senator's remarks").
24. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Decent Exposure, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Jan. 25, 2004, at
10 (reviewing IRSHAD MANJI, THE TROUBLE WITH ISLAM: A MUSLIM'S CALL FOR REFORM IN
HER FAITH (2003)) (noting "the difficult topic of American foreign policy as a critical aspect of
the defanging of Islamism"); see also infra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 20; see also infra note 170 and accompanying text.
26. Cf. Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 625 (2003)
(contending that Justice Jackson's famous "no orthodoxy" claim in W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette "committed the Court ... and indeed the nation ... to a course of massive collective
delusion, and to a constitutional discourse reflecting and perpetuating that delusion").
27. See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (2001); Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just
Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997).
Our understandings of, and attitudes toward, these notions are complicated,
to say the least. A decade ago, in a provocative and prescient reflection on
the Mozert litigation and the "paradox of a liberal education," Professor
Stolzenberg observed that "tolerance" is often "prescribed as a defense
against enforced assimilation."2  She noted Justice Brennan's frequently
quoted claim that "[w]e are not an assimilative, homogenous society, but a
facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone
else's unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse
protects our own idiosyncrasies."29 Certainly, we tend to celebrate dissent,
disagreement, and iconoclasm. With Justice Douglas, we "honor[ I the right
to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness," and we celebrate
"lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence."3 At the same
time, we profess in our Great Seal and in our Melting Pot myths the
assimilative hope-e pluribus unum3"-that unity can emerge from and
transcend our pluralism and protected idiosyncrasies. Nor are we of one mind
with respect to the meaning and merits of "toleration":32 As Professor Smith
has observed, toleration need not be "neutral." It is consistent with-indeed, it
seems by definition to involve-judgment and disapproval. 3 To some, it is
even oppressive."
The premises underlying the Court's "no religious decisions" rule and
our thinking about the appropriate stance of liberal governments toward
the content and development of religious doctrine and other "ecclesiastical
matters" are similarly complex. Obviously, that such governments tolerate
objectionable doctrine does not mean they are neutral or indifferent toward
28. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REv. 581, 582 (1993). The
Mozert case involved a challenge by "fundamentalist Christians" to their "local [public] schools'
requirement that children read from a textbook series that introduced the students to a variety of
perspectives and attitudes." Id. at 583, 584; see also id. at 584 n.5 (providing citations for the "five
published opinions that form the core of the Mozert litigation").
29. Id. at 582 n.1 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
30. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
31. "Out of many, one." The Great Seal of the United States depicts, among other things,
an American bald eagle, holding in its beak a scroll inscribed with the motto, "E pluribus unum."
More information on the Great Seal is available at the web site of U.S. Scouting,
http://www.usscouts.org/flag/sealmotto.html.
32. Steven D. Snth, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL L. REV. 305, 305-06 (1990) ("Although
it has never wholly disappeared from liberal diction, 'tolerance,' like 'patriotism,' 'higher law,' 'religion,' and
'obedience,' may evoke ambivalent feelings in the proponents of liberal democracy.").
33. Id. at 306 ("Properly speaking, one can 'tolerate' only beliefs or practices of which one
disapproves.").
34. See, e.g., Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE
TOLERANCE 81 (1969).
The Development of Doctrine 1651
it. Through this Article's examination of Justice Brennan's richly ambiguous
warning in Hull Church, we are reminded that-notwithstanding hornbook
maxims to the contrary-governments like ours not only take "cognizance"
of religion,35 they also seek to assimilate religious traditions' doctrines and
demands to their own.36 Indeed, state actions touching on religious doctrine,
and state efforts to shape and direct its development, are not unlike the
evangelizing, proselytizing, and even indoctrinating activities of religious
communities and believers. And yet, our constitutional law and church-state
rhetoric purport to rule out such actions and efforts. What are needed, then,
are revisions to our discourse about state action and religious doctrine, about
orthodoxy and neutrality, and about assimilation and toleration. Such
revisions are warranted, if only to return candor to the relevant legal,
political, and moral arguments,37 and thereby to provide more reliable
protection for religious freedom, properly understood.
I. THE LAW KNOWS NO HERESY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE "No
RELIGIOUS DECISIONS" RULE
During the Summer and Fall of 2003, there was widespread talk of
separation and schism in the Episcopal Church, and even in the worldwide
Anglican Communion,38 over that Church's decision to consecrate an
openly gay priest as a bishop in New Hampshire. 9 In the course of these
35. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 64 (1947) ("We maintain therefore that
in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."); see also Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and
Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1986) ("In my view, the establishment clause absolutely disables the government from taking a
position for or against religion.... The government must have no opinion because it is not the
government's role to have an opinion.").
36. Cf. Stolzenberg, supra note 28, at 637 (noting the "'imperial' aspect of objective
discourse, which although neutral in one sense nevertheless represents a form of socialization that
rivals the Amish community's efforts to socialize adolescents into their traditional way of life").
37. Smith, supra note 26, at 626 ("W]e do not have that sort of ruggedly honest
jurisprudence. Instead, we have a jurisprudence of subterfuges and elusive (or illusory) distinctions-
one that requires us to pretend ... that in the realm of belief, government cannot and therefore does
not prescribe ... any 'right opinions."').
38. The Episcopal Church, or Episcopal Church in the USA (ECUSA), is the American
branch of the Anglican Communion, which itself consists of thirty-eight self-governing Christian
churches historically connected to the Church of England and now in communion with the See of
Canterbury. More information is available at the ECUSA's web site, at http://www.episcopalchurch.org.
39. The Rev. Canon V. Gene Robinson was consecrated bishop of the Episcopal Church's
Diocese of New Hampshire on November 2, 2003. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Rev. Rowan
Williams, warned that the resulting divisions "would have very serious consequences for the cohesion
of the Anglican Communion." Statement from the Archbishop of Canterbury following the
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conversations, and in the midst of heated moral and theological
disagreements, it was often observed that any such division would have
implications not only for the Church's doctrines and its members' beliefs and
practices, but also, more prosaically, for the ownership of its not-insignificant
properties. 0 In Pittsburgh, one local parish even filed a preemptive lawsuit
"to preserve and protect the unity and integrity of the property" of the
Church' and to prevent "conservative" dioceses and parishes from taking
Church property with them in the event of a denominational split. And
when thousands of dissenting "conservative" Episcopalians gathered in Dallas
to protest the New Hampshire consecration, their stated purpose was not
only to "reaffirm [traditional] doctrines," but also to "scour canon law and
mull what promise[s] to be the most bitter part of the dispute: Who gets the
money if the Episcopal Church splits in two?"4'2
The Court's Hull Church decision emerged from a similar controversy.
The local Savannah congregations who elected to break communion with
the Presbyterian Church in the United States no doubt felt called to "reaffirm
[traditional] doctrines," while the Church was no less anxious to "preserve
and protect the unity and integrity of [its] property." Thirty-five years ago,
the departing churches' complaint was not about the consecration of a
divorced and openly gay bishop, but that the Church had gone astray by
ordaining.., women as ministers and ruling elders, making pro-
nouncements and recommendations concerning civil, economic, social
and political matters, giving support to the removal of Bible reading
and prayers by children in the public schools ... [and]
consecration of Canon Gene Robinson as Bishop-coadjutor of New Hampshire, available at
http://www.anglicancommunion.org/acns/articles/36/50/acns3658.html (Nov. 3, 2003).
40. See, e.g., Mark Miller & Dirk Johnson, Souls Divided, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 2003, at 52
("This schism sets the stage for potentially vicious litigation over tens of millions of dollars of church
property-and it raises a question at the heart of the culture wars: Whose church is it anyway?");
Richard N. Ostling, Episcopal Property Could Be at Stake, WASH. PosT, Aug. 23, 2003, at B7 (quoting
one canon law expert as saying: "This could be the biggest church real estate sale in history.").
41. Steve Levin, Episcopal Property Lawsuit Filed Here, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 25,
2003, at Al.
42. Philip Chalk, Houses of Worship: Who Gets What?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2003, at W15;
see also Episcopalians Meet To Discuss A Possible Split, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, § 1, at 16. As this
Article was being revised, it remained unclear whether or to what extent Bishop Robinson's election
and consecration will divide the Anglican Communion or the Episcopal Church. Evidently, "a third
of the Anglican provinces [have] declar[edj themselves-to varying degrees--out of communion
with the Americans." Stephen Bates, US Anglicans Naive About Gay Bishop, THE GUARDIAN, Mar.
6, 2004, at 11. A commission set up by the Episcopal Church to investigate the fallout is slated to
report in early 2005. See Stephen Bates, US Church Must Repent for Gay Bishop Decision, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 16, 2004, at 2. One bishop has suggested, however, that "heresy" is to be preferred
to "schism." See Editorial, Heresy-and Schism, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 5, 2004, at A10
(quoting Bishop Peter Lee).
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disseminat[ing] publications denying the Holy Trinity and violating
the moral and ethical standards of the faith.43
The local congregations' moves spurred Church officials "to take over
the local churches' property... until new local leadership could be
appointed," which in turn prompted civil lawsuits seeking "to enjoin the
[Church] from trespassing on the disputed property. '
Eventually, a Chatham County jury accepted the local churches' claims
that the Church's allegedly heterodox teachings and actions "'amount[ed] to
a fundamental or substantial abandonment of the [Church's] original tenets
and doctrines,"' and that the Church had therefore violated its obligation
under a trust of local church property implied in Georgia law4 to "adhere to
its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local
churches." 6 Accordingly, the trial judge concluded that the implied trust
had terminated, and with it the Church's right to occupy or otherwise
interfere with the local church property in question.47 In other words, the
Church had lost its rights to the local church property by embracing "new"
religious doctrines and forsaking the originals.
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the First Amendment
does not "permit a civil court to award church property on the basis of the
interpretation and significance the civil court assigns to aspects of church
doctrine."' Writing for a unanimous Court,49 Justice Brennan acknowledged
that "[i]t is of course true that the State has a legitimate interest in resolving
property disputes," that "a civil court is a proper forum for that resolution,"
and that "there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all [church]
property disputes."5 Nonetheless, he insisted that "it [is] wholly inconsistent
with the American concept of the relationship between church and state to
permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical questions,"'" warning that it
43. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 442 n. 1 (1969) (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 443.
45. Id. The case's implied-trust and departure-from-doctrine theory "derives from principles
fashioned by English courts." Id. at 443 n.2.
46. Id. at 443. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the case below. 159 S.E.2d 690
(Ga. 1968).
47. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 444.
48. Id. at 441.
49. Justice Harlan wrote separately to clarify a specific point, but nonetheless concurred in
Justice Brennan's opinion. Id. at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 445,449.
51. Id. at 445-46 (discussing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872)); see also id. at
450 ("[Tlhe departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil
court to determine matters at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church
doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment
forbids civil courts from playing such a role."); id. at 449 ("First Amendment values are plainly
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"would lead to the total subversion of ... religious bodies" if church
authorities' decisions about church doctrine could be appealed to the "secular
courts."52 In other words, it cannot be up to a government official to decide
whether a church has sold out its theological patrimony, exchanged it for
faddish doctrinal novelties, and therefore forfeited its interest in trust
property. Such decisions and inquiries, Justice Brennan asserted, are wholly
inimical to the "spirit of freedom for religious organizations" that animates
our First Amendment. 3  Rather, our Constitution guarantees to such
organizations "an independence from secular control or manipulation" and
the "power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine."54
Hull Church is one of a cluster of consonant cases that illustrate and
stand for what Professor Volokh calls the First Amendment's "no religious
decisions" principle." Nearly a century earlier, in Watson v. Jones,56 the Court
had similarly refused "to decree the termination of an implied trust because of
departures from doctrine by [a] national [Presbyterian] organization.""
Although Watson did not directly involve the interpretation and application
of the First Amendment, it was "nonetheless informed by First Amendment
considerations,"58 and the Justices observed that "[tihe law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma."' 9
These and similar "considerations" were constitutionalized in Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,'s a fascinating and politically delicate case arising
out of a dispute within the Russian Orthodox Church. New York's legis-
lature had purported to "transfer the control of the New York churches of
the Russian Orthodox religion from the central governing hierarchy of the
Russian Orthodox Church... to the governing authorities of the Russian
Church in America." The Court concluded that "[s]uch a law violates the
jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of
controversies over religious doctrine and practice.").
52. Id. at 446 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-29).
53. Id. at 448 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
54. Id. (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116).
55. See VOLOKH, supra note 10, at 826-40.
56. 80 U.S. 679. The Watson case is discussed in some detail in Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 110-17.
57. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 445.
58. Id.; see also id. at 445 n.4. As the Hull Church Court noted, several post-Watson
"nonconstitutional" decisions "recognize that there might be some circumstances in which marginal
civil court review of ecclesiastical determinations would be appropriate," but also reiterate the notion
that "[iun the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals
on matters purely ecclesiastical ... are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive."
Id. at 447 (quoting Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)).
59. Id. at 446 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 728).
60. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
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Fourteenth Amendment. It prohibits in this country the free exercise of
religion."' The Justices were unimpressed by the fact that the legislature had
required the New York churches to continue to adhere to traditional doctrine
and practices; after all, "[sIhould the state assert power to change the statute
requiring conformity to ancient faith and doctrine to one establishing a
different doctrine, the invalidity would be unmistakable." '2  As Justice
Frankfurter framed the matter in a concurring opinion, "[wihat is at stake
here is the power to exercise religious authority." He insisted that "[t]he judiciary
has heeded, naturally enough, the menace to a society like ours of attempting to
settle such religious struggles by state action."63 In the end, Frankfurter concluded
that "it is not open to the governments of this Union to reinforce the loyalty of
their citizens by deciding who is the true exponent of their religion."6
4
The Court reaffirmed this conclusion in the 1976 Milivojevich case,65
overturning a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court that purported to review
the procedural and substantive merits of the proceedings through which that
61. Id. at 107. But see id. at 130 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[The law] has not interfered
with.., anyone's exercise of his religion. New York has not outlawed the Soviet-controlled sect nor
forbidden it to exercise its authority or teach its dogma in any place whatsoever except this piece of
property.").
As the Court's discussion of the relevant facts makes clear, the underlying dispute within the
Church-like the one in the New York legislature-is difficult to separate from the "political
disturbances which culminated.., in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917," subsequent relations
between the Church and the Soviet government, and mid-century relations between that
government and the United States. Id. at 102. Interestingly, the Justices observed that the New
York Court of Appeals had taken judicial "notice that the Russian Government exercised control
over the central church authorities and that the American church [had] acted to protect its pulpits
and faith from such influences," and had also stated "that the Legislature's reasonable
belief... justified the State in enacting a law to free the American group from infiltration of such
atheistic or subversive influences." Id. at 108-09; see also id. at 117-18. The Supreme Court seems
to have been similarly wary of the "dangers" of "subversive action" and "political use of church
pulpits." Id. at 109; see also id. at 127 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have an ostensible religious
schism with decided political overtones."); id. at 130 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I do not think New
York law must yield to the authority of a foreign and unfriendly state masquerading as a spiritual
institution.").
In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter elaborated on the fear of "political religion,"
noting that "the fear, perhaps not wholly groundless, that the loyalty of its citizens might be diluted
by their adherence to a church entangled in antagonistic political interests, reappears in history as
the ground for interference by civil government with religious attachments." Id. at 123-24
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). By way of illustration, Justice Frankfurter reminded his readers that "[it
was on this basis, after all, that Bismarck sought to detach German Catholics from Rome by a series
of laws not too different in purport from that before us today." Id. at 124.
62. Id. at 108.
63. Id. at 122 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter emphasized also that
"[l]egislatures have no ... power.., to settle conflicts of religious authority and none to define
religious obedience." Id.
64. Id. at 125 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
65. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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church had "defrocked" one of its bishops. "The Holy Assembly of Bishops and
the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church [had] suspended and
ultimately removed ... Milivojevich. . .as Bishop of the American-Canadian
Diocese of that Church," and he, in turn, had challenged that action in the
civil courts of Illinois.66 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that
"[t]he basic dispute [was] over control of the ... Diocese .... its property and
assets. 67 With respect to that dispute, the Supreme Court of Illinois concluded
that the Bishop's "removal and defrockment had to be set aside as 'arbitrary'
because the proceedings were not conducted according to the [court's]
interpretation of the Church's constitution and penal code., 68 However, relying
heavily on Hull Church, Watson, and Kedroff,69 Justice Brennan insisted that the
Illinois Court's decision was unconstitutional in "that it rest[ed] upon an
impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals
of this hierarchical church upon the issues in dispute, and impermissibly
substitute[d] its own inquiry into church policy and resolutions based thereon
of those disputes."7
There is, of course, much more that could be said about these particular
cases, about church-property disputes, and about church-autonomy principles
more generally." For present purposes, it is sufficient to emphasize that the
point of these cases and principles is not that government officials and courts
may not render decisions about "religion." Indeed, such decisions could
66. Id. at 697-98. His "immediate reaction," actually, "was to refuse to accept the [decisions
of the Mother Church] on the ground that [they] contravened the administrative autonomy of the
Diocese guaranteed by the Diocesan constitution." Id. at 704. After several rounds of Church
proceedings, id. at 704-06, he filed suit in Lake County, Illinois, id. at 706-07.
67. Id. at 698. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, both dissenting, took a strikingly different
view of the case's history and basic nature. Id. at 725-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 708.
69. Cf. id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The cases upon which the Court relies are not a
uniform line of authorities leading inexorably to reversal of the Illinois judgment."); id. at 733
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The rule of those cases... is that the government may not displace the free
religious choices of its citizens by placing its weight behind a particular religious belief, tenet, or sect.").
70. Id. at 708. In Justice Brennan's view, "this case essentially involves not a church property
dispute, but a religious dispute the resolution of which under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not
civil tribunals." Id. at 709. Quoting his own opinion in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring), Justice
Brennan warned that "permit[ting] civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power
within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide.., religious law [governing church polity] ... would
violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine."
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709.
71. See generally, Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1142 (1962); Bradley, supra note 9; Philip Hamburger, Illiberal Liberalism: Liberal
Theology, Anti-Catholicism, and Church Property, 12 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 693 (2002); Douglas
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
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hardly be avoided by a court charged with interpreting our First
Amendment. 2 It is, instead, that state actors should not render religious
decisions, that is, decisions involving the interpretation, application, or
enforcement of religious beliefs, obligations, or doctrine. 3 As Professor
Koppelman has succinctly put it, in a slightly different context, the animating
idea is "that the government may not declare religious truth."74
Variations on this almost universally accepted rule appear over and
again in a wide variety of the Court's Religion Clause decisions: Government
officials may inquire into the sincerity, but not the consistency,
reasonableness, or orthodoxy of religious beliefs;" they must act and legislate
with a "secular purpose" ;76 courts are cautious when inquiring into the
"centrality" of a particular religious belief or practice;77 the Constitution does
not permit state action that creates or requires "excessive entanglement"
between the government and religious institutions, practices, and teachings,78
and also commands that "secular and religious authorities.., not interfere
with each other's respective spheres of choice and influence"; 79 and so on.
These cases and doctrines reflect, among other things, an under-
standable skepticism about state actors' competence and incentives in
theological and religious matters,"0 and also an appropriate concern for the
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ").
73. Cf. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 735 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[While there may be a
number of good arguments that civil courts of a State should, as a matter of the wisest use of their
authority, avoid adjudicating religious disputes to the maximum extent possible, they obviously
cannot avoid all such adjudications.").
74. Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 89 (2002). Koppelman also
observes that it is an "axiom [of t]he Establishment Clause" that the "Clause forbids the state from
declaring religious truth." Id. at 108; see also Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in Public
Schools, 18 J.L. & POL. 329, 331 (2002) ("That schools should not teach the truth of religious
propositions has always seemed to me a sound principle.").
75. See generally Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1944); TRIBE, supra note 10, § 14-6, at 1181-83.
76. See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); TRIBE, supra note 10, § 14-9, at 1204-14;
Koppelman, supra note 74.
77. See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Hernandez v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); TRIBE, supra note 10, § 14-12, at 1248 (warning that "any
more than minimal scrutiny might impinge upon free exercise values").
78. See generally Lemon, 403 U.S. 602; Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
79. TRIBE, supra note 10, § 14-11, at 1226; see also VOLOKH, supra note 10, at 916-21
(discussing "no delegations to religious institutions principle" under which "[t]he government may
not delegate certain kinds of government power to religious institutions").
80. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715 ("Intrafaith differences ... are not uncommon among followers
of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences.");
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 n.8 (1976) ("Civil judges obviously do
not have the competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in applying the 'law' that governs ecclesiastical
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independence of religious institutions and the consciences of religious
believers.8' Cases like Hull Church make sense both because there is little
reason anymore to expect that lawyers and judges will have the training
necessary to decide whether a local congregation has "abandon[ed]... its
original tenets and doctrines," and because allowing state actors to make and
enforce decisions about church doctrine and discipline seems a bit like asking
Mayor Daley to conduct the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, or like allowing
the Green Party to parse and compose the Libertarian Party's platform. Thus,
although it has been argued that this reticence on the part of law and courts
hamstrings both the liberalism and the religious freedom it is thought to
serve,82 the "no religious decisions" principle is, and will almost certainly
remain, at the heart of our Religion Clause doctrine.
disputes."); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872) ("It is not to be supposed that
the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of
[church] bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.").
81. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721-22 ("[Rleligious freedom encompasses the 'power (of
religious bodies) to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine."' (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))).
Another reason that is sometimes suggested for embracing the rule applied in Hull Church is
the idea that "religious truth by its nature [is] not subject to a test of validity determined by
rational thought and empiric knowledge." TRIBE, supra note 10, § 14-11, at 1232 n.46 (quoting
PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1964)); cf. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
714-75. The Milivojevich case states:
Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are
to be accepted as matters of faith, whether or not rational or measurable by objective
criteria. Constitutional concerns of due process, involving secular notions of 'fundamental
fairness' or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of
ecclesiastical cognizance.
Id. As Professor Sunder has stated, "religion" is "constructed" in liberal theory as private, and
entirely beyond reason and its methods. Sunder, supra note 20, at 1415-25.
However, it is not at all clear either that notions of "fundamental fairness" are "hardly
relevant" to ecclesiastical or canonical matters, or that "departure from doctrine" questions and
theological inquiries defy "reasoned" analysis or resolution. Cf. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 726-27
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, Professor Tribe's claim, noted above, itself seems, ironically,
to depend on contestable theological premises about the nature and objects of religious belief. A
different view was offered by John Henry Newman, who insisted more than a century ago that:
Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in dealing with it as a fact in
the world's history. Its genius and character, its doctrines, precepts, and objects cannot be
treated as matters of private opinion or deduction .... It may indeed legitimately be made
the subject-matter of theories .... It has long since passed beyond the letter of documents
and the reasonings of individual minds, and has become public property.
JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 3 (Notre
Dame ed., 1989); see also Sunder, supra note 20, at 1423 ("[Rleligion is much more ... subject to
reasoned argument and change than earlier theorists acknowledged.").
82. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to
Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 134 (1997) ("[By grouping
together different religious practices, courts may grant improper protections to professed adherents,
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1I. UNPACKING THE NOTION OF "DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE"
Justice Brennan's opinion in Hull Church makes descriptive, predictive,
and normative claims about a particular phenomenon, that is, the "devel-
opment of doctrine. '"" My project is to unpack, examine, and learn from these
claims. Accordingly, in this part, I focus more precisely on this phenomenon,
before turning to the question whether the "development of doctrine" is,
should, or ever could be "free" or a "matter of purely ecclesiastical concern."
First, what is "doctrine"? The Latin word doctrina means "teaching."
Along the same line, Professor Wolfe's recent, widely noted study, The
Transformation of American Religion, provides this colloquial, but workable,
definition: "Doctrine can be defined as a body of teachings specific to a par-
ticular religion that spells out an understanding of who God is and what he
demands of human beings." 4  Certainly, this formulation would require
substantial revision before it could be useful in theological discourse. It is also
worth noting that the definition fails to capture the contents of nontheistic
or nonethical religious traditions. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for present
purposes." The "development of doctrine," then, is a change, set of changes,
or trajectory of change in a religion's teachings.
resulting in unnecessary burdens on government and society, or, conversely, may permit unduly
harsh governmental limitations on religious liberties.").
83. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("[When] civil courts undertake to resolve
[doctrinal] controversies. . . the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of
religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.").
84. ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION: How WE
ACTUALLY LIVE OUR FAITH 67 (2003); cf. David B. Hart, A Most Partial Historian, FIRST
THINGS, Dec. 2003, at 35 (reviewing 3 MAURICE COWLING, RELIGION AND PUBLIC DOCTRINE
IN MODERN ENGLAND: ACCOMMODATIONS (2001), and using "public doctrine" to mean "the
entire spectrum of orthodoxies and heterodoxies propounded by the literature of popular, literary,
and scholarly discourse in the public forum").
In the Roman Catholic context, Canon 750 of the Code of Canon Law states that Catholic
doctrine-that is, "[t]hose things that are to be believed by divine and catholic faith"-consists of
those things
which are contained in the word of God as it has been written or handed down by tradition,
that is, in the single deposit of faith entrusted to the Church, and which are at the same time
proposed as divinely revealed either by the solemn Magisterium of the Church, or by its
ordinary and universal Magisterium, which in fact is manifested by the common adherence of
Christ's faithful under the guidance of the sacred Magisterium.
John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Motu proprio, Ad tuendam fidem 9 4(A) (1998).
85. An appropriately detailed discussion of the complexities surrounding the meaning, nature,
and function of "doctrine" would go well beyond the scope of this Article or the training of this
author. For one influential and challenging work engaging these matters, see GEORGE A. LINDBECK,
THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND THEOLOGY IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE (1984) (discussing,
among other things, "doctrines and their problems").
It should also be noted that religious doctrine of a social, moral, or political character will be
regarded by many theologians as raising different concerns and problems than "pure dogma." Avery
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In addition to this working definition, at least the following three
points are presumed: First, while it is reasonable to expect that a religion's
"doctrine" will overlap substantially with what professed adherents actually
believe, it makes sense to draw a distinction-one between aspiration and
reality, perhaps-between religious doctrine and religious beliefs. After all,
in any religious tradition or community, there will be disagreements, dis-
sent, and ignorance. 6  What is more, not all religions lodge teaching
authority in particular offices and structures or conceive of "authority" in
the same way. Still, it seems safe enough to distinguish the "orthodox" doctrines
of a faith tradition from the subjective beliefs and the creative, or simply
mistaken, interpretations of some of its members. Second, and relatedly,
although it is likely that a religion's rituals, liturgies, and art will reflect and
express its doctrine, they should not be equated with it. That a religious
tradition's church architecture and hymnody change (or degrade) does not
necessarily indicate changes in doctrine, although the former certainly
might presage or prompt the latter. Finally, it is worth distinguishing a
religion's doctrines, or "teachings," from its "expression" more generally.
Not everything that a religious leader, official, or believer says, whether
about prayer or politics, about the Resurrection or recycling, is "doctrine."
In sum-and recognizing, again, that trained theologians would want to
explore and refine these claims with more care than is possible or necessary
here-a religion's "doctrines" are its core, orthodox teachings about, and
understanding of, who God is and what human persons therefore are and
should be. They are not only what a religion's professed adherents in fact
believe, but are also-and more importantly-what they are or ought to
believe, given their profession.
What does it mean, then, for doctrine to "develop"? The term would
seem to involve more than mere change; it connotes more than the substi-
tution of one religious proposition for another. "Development" suggests an
unfolding; it implies changes in accord with some kind of narrative or prin-
ciple. The development of doctrine, accordingly, should be separated, or
Cardinal Dulles, Religious Freedom: Innovation and Development, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2001, at 35;
John T. Noonan, Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 662, 669 (1993)
(distinguishing "changes in theological propositions" from "mutations of morals"). Professor Alan
Brownstein, in conversation and at the Symposium of which this Article is a part, noted a similar
distinction.
86. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A
SAFE DISTANCE 269 (2003) (noting that "Americans profess strong religious convictions but appear
to know little about basic religious ideas and facts" and that "Americans' theological ignorance
is ... remarkable").
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perhaps distilled, from a broader, shapeless notion of change or transfor-
mation in religion.
Certainly, as Professor Wolfe has described, "religion" in America has
been and is being radically "transformed."87 Starting with what might be called
the demographics of American religion, America's longstanding diversity of
religious traditions, and not simply of Protestant Christian denominations,
continues to expand.88 This diversity is no longer confined simply to different
forms of Puritanism, or to "higher" and "lower" forms of Protestant
Christianity; it has long since outpaced Will Herberg's famous "Protestant,
Catholic, Jew" taxonomy.s9 In Professor Brownstein's words, "[tihe range of
religious beliefs throughout the United States is extraordinarily broad," and
"[t]he variety of rituals, forms, of worship, and rules of conduct practiced by
religious individuals and groups is equally substantial in scope."' What
might once have been fairly characterized as a "righteous" (Protestant)
empire," or a "Christian nation,"92 or a "religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being" 93 today is home to about as many Jews as live
87. See WOLFE, supra note 84. For a few recent reviews of Wolfe's book, see, for example,
Edward Rothstein, Reason and Faith: Eternally Bound, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at B7; Jeff Sharlet,
A Trio of Books on the Meaning of Worship in the Post-Aquarian Age, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2003, at
T13; Stephen R. Warner, They're OK, We're OK, BOOKS & CULTURE, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 20.
88. See, e.g., Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice
and its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 127 (2003) ("The last thirty-five years have seen
an exponential increase in American pluralism, and in the number and diversity of religions."). See
generally MARK NOLL, AMERICA'S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN 3-4
(2002) (studying the American "confluence" of "evangelicalism, republicanism, and common sense,"
noting that "[tihe changes taking place in American religious thought from the 1730s to the 1860s
were part of a general shift within Western religious life," and observing that "[t]hroughout this
period, the theological spectrum in America was broadening considerably").
89. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
SOCIOLOGY (1955). As Professor Schuck observes, "America is an anomaly among modem
postindustrial societies" in that "its religiosity is more diverse." SCHUCK, supra note 86, at 261; see
also id. at 266-67 ("An estimated 1,600 religions and denominations exist in the United States, a far
cry from the 'three-religion country' proclaimed by Will Herberg in the 1950s.") On religious
diversity in America generally, see, for example, DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW
A "CHRISTIAN COUNTRY" HAS Now BECOME THE WORLD'S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE
NATION (2001); SCHUCK, supra note 86, at 261-308.
90. Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and
Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 186 n.234 (2002) (citing, inter alia, JAMES W. FRASER,
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE: RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION IN MULTICULTURAL
AMERICA 4 (1999) ("[Alt the dawn of the new millennium the peoples of the United States are
more secular, especially in their public culture, more religious, in many different private forms, and
more diverse than ever before in the nation's history.")).
91. MARTIN E MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE. THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA
(1970).
92. Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
93. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,313 (1952).
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in Israel and to as many Muslims as Episcopalians. American "religion" now
includes a wide variety of worshipping, teaching traditions and doctrine-
promulgating institutions. And it offers to those leery of traditions and
institutions an endless menu of loose and less confining spiritual affiliations.
To speak of the "development of doctrine" is not simply to talk about changes
to Christian teachings, or within particular Christian groups, but about the
teachings of innumerable groups, communities, traditions, and sects, all moving
(or not) and developing (or not) in response to a wide range of cultural and
other pressures and constraints.
Religion has changed, or "transformed," in other ways, too. Demo-
graphics and affiliations aside, American law, culture, and economics have
radically altered not only the profiles of religious believers, but also the very
nature of religious belief.94 Indeed, Wolfe seems right to conclude that "in
every aspect of the religious life, American faith has met American culture-
and American culture has triumphed."9 In America today, "religion [simply] is
like everything else."96  Religious believers, in Wolfe's account, are neither
94. See WOLFE, supra note 84, at 2-3 (asserting that American religion, which is "always in
a state of transition," has "in the last half century or so ... been further transformed with dazzling
speed," and is still "being transformed in radically new directions"). Wolfe advanced a similar
argument a few years ago in a more general survey of American attitudes on allegedly divisive
social and cultural issues. See ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS
AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT: GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE,
IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALITY, WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LEFT AND EACH OTHER (2000).
Another helpful treatment of the "sea-change in the way religion is practiced and understood" in
America is provided by Professor French. French, supra note 88, at 127.
95. WOLFE, supra note 84, at 2-3. It is no exaggeration, Wolfe thinks, to say that "in the
United States, culture has transformed Christ, as well as all other religions found on these shores."
Id. "American culture is the world's teenager, vibrantly exuberant if often crass," and "has remade all
in its path, homogenizing everything from the food we eat to the TV we watch.... God never had a
chance against this juggernaut." Rich Barlow, 'Transformation' a Thoughtful Analysis of U.S. Culture's
Impact on Religion, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2003, at 63 (book review). In a recent magazine article,
Professor Wolfe restated and condensed, for a U.K. audience, his thesis that "[w]e should worry less
about America's conservatives. They are more American than they are Christian." Alan Wolfe,
Dieting for Jesus, PROSPECT, Dec. 18, 2003; cf. Hart, supra note 84, at 38 (reporting the connection
between "the accommodationism of English Christian latitudinarians, attempting to adjust
themselves to the supremacy of secularist public doctrine" and the "final victory of the public
orthodoxy that now nourishes the imperturbable sanctimony, hectoring moralism, tender
authoritarianism, and infinite dreariness of post-Christian Britain").
96. WOLFE, supra note 84, at 245 (quoting PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY:
ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION 26 (1967)); see also id. at 2-3 (observing
that while "strong religious believers" are often regarded by "liberal and secular" Americans as a
"breed apart," as "fanatics," as "frustrated people rendered insecure by the dilemmas and
opportunities of modernity," or even as "petty tyrants, invoking divine authority to limit the
freedom of those they fear," the truth is that "[wihether or not the faithful ever were a people
apart, they are so no longer").
Of course, to report Wolfe's account of religion's "transformation" is not necessarily to endorse
the account, or to join him in celebrating the change. Compare WOLFE, supra note 84, at 4 ("ITihere
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"resident aliens" nor "threat[s] to liberal democratic values";" neither "saviors
nor sectarians";" neither "exotic nor an endangered species."" On the
contrary, they are so completely and typically American that, Wolfe predicts,
"if Jonathan Edwards were alive and well, he would likely be appalled; far
from living in a world elsewhere, the faithful in the United States are
remarkably like everyone else."'" It appears that the vast middle swath of
America is tolerant, latitudinarian, flexible, and content, 1' American's much
remarked division and polarization notwithstanding.
Of course, it could well be that Wolfe overstates the matter, and that
vibrantly countercultural religious belief and expression persist and remain
more influential than the previous paragraph suggests. Still, it is hard to deny
the striking changes in Americans' religious sensibilities or consciousness-
that is, in what we think "religion" is and is for. It is difficult here to avoid
generalizations, and to capture and describe these changes precisely. 2
Nonetheless, we can safely say that "religion" is understood differently,
experienced differently, selected differently, and therefore speaks differently
today than it once was and did. In other words, wholly apart from the sheer
number of religious affiliations and descriptions that are now available,
Americans think differently than they did before about what it means to
affiliate with a religious community and to embrace, affirm, or profess a religious
doctrine. 3 For example, it is often said that contemporary Americans'
is nothing in the transformation of American religion.., that ought to cause [people of faith] bitter
anguish and apocalyptic rejection."), and id. at 262 ("Sometimes the more seemingly frivolous of the
ways Americans practice their faith turn out to be blessings in disguise."), with Neuhaus, supra note
17, at 66 ("IT]here are numerous Catholic, evangelical, Protestant, and Jewish thinkers who agree
with much of Wolfe's diagnosis. What they lament, however, [Wolfe] thinks we should celebrate.").
97. WOLFE, supra note 84, at 253, 255.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 254.
100. Id. at 3. My colleague George Marsden has published recently a widely praised history and
assessment of Edwards and his work. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, JONATHAN EDWARDS: A LIFE (2003).
101. See, e.g., DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE NEW UPPER CLASS AND How
THEY GOT THERE (2000). John Courtney Murray once made a similar point about "unbelief' in
America: "Unbelief in America has been rather easy-going, the product more of a naive
materialism than of any conscious conviction." JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD
THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 58 (1960).
102. Gamett, supra note 15, at 798 (describing "state-sponsored change in religious believers'
own notions of what their faith means and what it requires" and gradual "re-making [of
religion].. . from a comprehensive account of the world to a therapeutic 'cocoon wrapped around
the solitary individual').
103. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 86, at 265 (suggesting that "further fragmentation" of
religion in America is "likely as the forces of secularism, pluralism, and bureaucratization transform
the nature, function, and relationships of religious groups"); id. at 268-69 (suggesting "that all
religions in America, including those with strong hierarchical organizations, become de facto
congregationist in form and practice" and stating that "[t]he ultimate destinations of [Americans']
The Development of Doctrine
religious beliefs, are, generally speaking, more emotional or "experiential"
than intellectual." Relatively few worry anymore about the alleged tension
between faith and reason, in part because we are all hard-wired now to think
that faith is non-reason, and that it operates in and speaks to realms where
reason has no place or little purchase. Thus, as commentator David Brooks
has observed, "Americans ... don't seem to care that their neighbors hold to
false versions of the faith."'0' It is not clear that many Americans think of
religion as being about truth claims at all, or of religious claims and arguments
as the kind of things that can be false. Instead, religion is regarded, even by
many of the religious, as an expression of subjective longings, of autonomous
self-expression and direction, and of consumer preferences, rather than as a
response to a set of proposed truth-claims about the meaning of life and the
destiny of the person. 6
These revisions-if that is what they are-to the sensibilities, prem-
ises, and expectations of American religious believers are not yet fully
understood or appreciated by those who think and write about religion, law,
and liberal democracy. In any event, observations and predictions about
government involvement with the "development of doctrine" will need to
account for the evolution in the ways religious believers and communities
conceive of "doctrine" in the first place.
If the much-remarked changes in religions' demographics and in reli-
gious consciousness should not be confused with the more discrete
implacable individualism... are the narcissistic, spiritual wanderings of the individuals and families
who populate the growing questing culture"); French, supra note 88, at 127 ("Americans in the new
century are in the midst of a sea-change in the way religion is practiced and understood.").
104. See WOLFE, supra note 84, at 81 (noting that believers "seek authenticity through
experience rather than through ideas"). A similar argument was advanced recently by New York
Times writer Frank Bruni, commenting on the "withering of the Christian faith in Europe and the
shift in its center of gravity." In Bruni's view, "for most, Christianity has evolved into an amorphous
spiritual inclination rather than an exacting creed." This is due, he thinks, to "cynicism about big
institutions, grand ideologies and unfettered allegiances." Frank Bruni, Faith Fades Where it Once
Burned Strong, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at Al.
105. David Brooks, The National Creed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2003, at A21 (citing Tocqueville).
Tocqueville also recorded in his diaries another's observation that "for the majority [of Americans]
religion is something respected and useful rather than a proved truth.... [I]n the depths of their souls
they have a pretty decided indifference about dogma. One never talks about that in the churches; it is
morality with which they are concerned." This journal entry is available at the C-Span web site
dedicated to Tocqueville's American tour, at http://www.tocqueville.org/md2.htm#1028a.
106. See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 84, at 17 (noting Charles Taylor's claim that "modern
religious life is characterized by a 'new individualism' in which personal expressiveness inevitably
plays a role"); id. at 74 (noting that evangelicalism "play[s] down doctrine in favor of feelings" and
that evangelical small-group meetings "provide powerful emotional experiences" but do not
"encourage any kind of doctrinal reflection"). See generally CHRISTAN SMITH, CHRISTIAN
AMERICA: WHAT EVANGELICALS REALLY WANT (2000).
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phenomenon of "development of doctrine," neither should doctrinal
development be equated with the "inculturation" of religion. This is a difficult,
somewhat esoteric subject-more of a theological category than a sociological
one-with which legal scholars are understandably unfamiliar. Strictly
speaking, it has more to do with the transformation of culture by religion
than the transformation of religion by culture. In the Roman Catholic
context, for example, "inculturation" can refer to "clothing the core faith in a
variety of cultural expressions for the purpose of cultural transformation.""' 7 It
has been emphasized that the "inculturation" of religion differs from
"acculturation," or assimilation, in that the former represents faith "liv[ing] in
and through the cultures we inhabit," while the latter involves "capitulat[ing]
to the wisdom, myths, and reality of a culture."'' 8 The idea, then, is that
religious traditions-in America and elsewhere, today as always-often adjust
and adapt in order to actualize and make meaningful in particular cultural
contexts the core of their commitments. What appears from an external
perspective to be a sweeping, culture-driven transformation of religion, or a
more discrete change in doctrine, might instead be seen from inside the
tradition as an application of that religion's doctrine, and as an attempt to speak
to and transform that culture.
Certainly, the theological intricacies of different traditions' attempts to
describe and respond to the challenge of inculturation go well beyond this
Article's scope. It is one thing to observe that religious practices and
sensibilities have changed at the hands or in the context of a given culture; it
is another to say that one of the challenges faced by many religious traditions
107. Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 782, 785 (1992) (collecting other sources discussing "inculturation" and related
concepts); see also id. at 785 n.6. See generally H. Richard Neibuhr, CHRIST AND CULTURE
(1951) (discussing various religious responses to the relationship, and conflicts, between religious
faith and culture).
The Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, in its Ecumenical Affirmation,
used the term "inculturation" similarly, to "describe the process by which the [Christian] Gospel is
transmitted to people in a given situation in a specific culture" and "allow the universal
message... to become present and understandable in a particular cultural milieu." Joel A.
Nichols, Mission, Evangelism, and Proselytism in Christianity: Mainline Conceptions as Reflected in
Church Documents, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 563, 617 (1998) (discussing the WCC Central
Committee's Ecumenical Affirmation: Mission and Evangelism).
108. JOHN F. CAVANAUGH, S.J., THE WORD ENCOUNTERED 68 (1996); see also John Paul
II, Redemptoris missio T 52 (proposing that inculturation is "not a matter of purely external
adaptation," but "means the intimate transformation of authentic cultural values through their
integration in Christianity and the insertion of Christianity in various human cultures"); id. at
[ 54 (noting that "culture is a human creation," is "therefore marked by sin," and so "needs to be
'healed, ennobled and perfected' (quoting Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic
Constitution on the Church, Lumen gentium 9 17)).
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is to find ways to voice their core claims in terms comprehensible at a
particular time, and in a particular place, without thereby signing over the
content of those claims to that time or place.'" This inculturation of a reli-
gious tradition will be guided by, and will proceed in light of, that tradition's
doctrine, and therefore should not be hastily conflated with changes or
development in the doctrine itself.
Finally, there is the process or phenomenon of "development of doc-
trine" strictly so-called, by which I mean substantive change in the moral,
theological, and other claims proposed by particular religious traditions to
their adherents. It is not only that there are now many gods in America
other than Christianity's, and also many religions other than Protestant
Christianity, that are available to be transformed; and it is not only that
Americans now evaluate the "products" in the religious marketplace
according to different criteria. The products themselves have changed."'
They have, it appears, "developed."
To be sure, doctrinal development is related to the other changes in
and to American religion. Like any other consumer product, doctrine is
changing in accord with the popular articulation of those emotional and
other needs to which religion is thought to respond."' As one reviewer of
Wolfe observed, "American faiths ... have tended to be optimistic and
easygoing"; as a result, Americans "feel free to try on different denomi-
nations at different points in [our] lives," and have "trouble taking religious
doctrines altogether seriously."'"2 By and large, even "Protestant fundamen-
talists"-those Americans who, according to Wolfe, "generally take doc-
trine the most seriously"' 3-are not looking for "correct" doctrines, but
rather for a "model that fits with pervasive cultural understandings about
choice, individualism, autonomy, the importance of the self, therapeutic
109. Cf. Avery Dulles, S.J., The Papacy for a Global Church, AMERICA, July 15, 2000, at 68
("The faith.., must be successfully incarnated in the many cultures of the world.").
110. Cf. Noonan, supra note 85, at 662 ("That the moral teachings of the Catholic Church
have changed over time will, I suppose, be denied by almost no one today.").
111. See WOLFE, supra note 84, at 246 ("It may seem sacrilegious even to suggest that the
process of choosing a good make of car or finding decent child care have as much to do with
emotional resonance as with a series of utilitarian calculations.").
112. Brooks, supra note 105; see also WOLFE, supra note 84, at 71 (noting that "evangelical
believers," although they often express a desire to "take ideas seriously," are "sometimes hard
pressed to explain exactly what, doctrinally speaking, their faith is"); id. at 88 (stating that many
American Catholics have internalized "evangelical" ways of thinking and, as a result, "doctrine is
simply not that important to them"); id. at 91 (concluding that Jews in America, notwithstanding
their rich traditions of study and exegesis, have not resisted the "twelve-step religious
confessionalism so widespread among evangelical religious believers").
113. WOLFE, supra note 84, at 67.
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sensibilities, and an anti-institutional inclination common today.' '.4  Still,
the theological, historical, and other considerations that one might expect to
animate assessments of "developments" in doctrine-for example, a concern
that such developments be authentic, and that they not distort the truth
thought to have been contained in the original revelation or deposit of
faith-increasingly seem irrelevant, except perhaps to working theologians,
as doctrine itself has become "mobile, elusive and flexible.""... This might
be surprising; "belief, after all, should involve belief in something."'"6 And
yet, Wolfe concedes, perhaps is naive to think that "people could continue
to believe in the power of the religious doctrines that once inspired their
ancestors when their society chews up ideas of any sort in order to digest
them for widespread public consumption. )1117
Turn back, for a moment, to the facts underlying the dispute in Hull
Church, and to the kind of "development[s]" Justice Brennan probably had in
mind. The Presbyterian Church in the United States had liberalized, the
local churches complained. The Church had compromised, and not merely
inculturated, its own traditional teachings: It had "departed from doctrine" by
ordaining women, "denying the Holy Trinity," and so forth."8 The objec-
tions of these two Savannah congregations were not to the Nation's
increasing religious diversity and not-at least not explicitly-to the consum-
erization of American believers and their sensibilities. Rather, their
objections were to what they regarded as changes, revisions, or "devel-
opment[s]" in doctrina, or teaching. It was these developments-their causes,
direction, and substance-that, in Justice Brennan's view, were not and could
not be proper objects of "secular" concern.
Now, the foregoing effort to identify more precisely the phenomenon
of "development of doctrine" has proceeded entirely apart from the rich
theological debates about the standards that should govern and constrain
the development of doctrine, about the markers of authentic development
that distinguish it from inculturation or corruption, and so on. In the
Roman Catholic context, for example, theologians from John Newman to
John Noonan have struggled with these important problems."9  Lively
114. Id. at 74.
115. Brooks, supra note 105.
116. WOLFE, supra note 84, at 95.
117. Id.
118. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 442 n.1 (1969) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
119. See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 81; Noonan, supra note 85, at 669-77 & n.22
(citing other work concerning "changes in propositions of faith"). As Newman put it,
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conversations continue about whether Catholic teachings on religious
freedom and capital punishment are restatements, developments,
innovations, or indefensible revisions of doctrine."' Legal scholars would
do well, for obvious and nonsectarian reasons internal to their own disci-
pline, to engage, or at least become more familiar with, these contro-
versies."' The aim in this part, though, has not been to intrude upon the
internal theological debates of one or any religious tradition, or to dissect the
cultural and other movements described above. Rather, it has been to
define precisely this notion of "the development of doctrine," and to differ-
entiate it from other social changes, religious expressions, and cultural
phenomena, so as to better assess Justice Brennan's statement that such
development should be "free" and that its substance is a matter of "ecclesiastical"
and not "secular" interest. For present purposes, the "development of doctrine"
does not refer to amorphous sweeping changes in the style of American religion
and the sensibilities of American believers. Instead, it refers to articulable
changes to identifiable, orthodox claims and teachings of specific religious
groups, regardless of whether these changes satisfy, from the point of view of
one standing within the relevant tradition, whatever criteria exist in that
tradition for distinguishing authentic development from heresy.
III. THE "UN-FREE" DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE
Justice Brennan's opinion in Hull Church is fairly read as claiming that
"development" in religious doctrine should be-and, as a matter of First
Amendment principle, must be-"free.' ' 2  Thus, before turning to the ques-
tion whether religious doctrine and its development are or should be matters
"true development ... corroborates, not corrects, the body of the thought from which it
proceeds." NEWMAN, supra note 81, at 145. Newman also suggested:
The development ... of an idea is not like an investigation worked out on paper, in which
each successive advance is a pure evolution from a foregoing, but it is carried on through
and by means of communities of men and their leaders and guides; and it employs their
minds as its instruments and depends upon them while it uses them.... It is the warfare of
ideas under their varying aspects striving for the mastery ....
Id. at 29.
120. See, e.g., Avery Cardinal Dulles, Catholicism and Capital Punishment, FIRST THINGS,
Apr. 2001, at 30; Dulles, supra note 85, at 39 ("Over the past fifty years we have seen a strong and
welcome development of the doctrine of religious freedom."); see also Noonan, supra note 85, at
673 ("[T]he Church has the mission of determining what is only the projection of subjective
feelings and what is an authentic response to Christ as revealed.").
121. For examples of such engagement by prominent legal scholars, see, for example,
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD?
RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003).
122. See supra note 18.
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only of "ecclesiastical concern," it makes sense to look a bit more closely at
this claim.
Justice Brennan almost certainly used the term "free" to mean
something like "free from direct, tangible influence or interference by
government." The contention that the development of doctrine should be
"free" in this sense is, under any attractive understanding of religious
freedom, sensible and even compelling. And yet, there is no denying that
governments like ours do prompt, shape, push, and constrain changes in
religious doctrine all the time and in all kinds of ways. They could hardly
do otherwise: Governments enact laws, laws are part of culture and operate
on persons, and religions speak, act, and take shape in and through culture
and persons.'23 In a sense, then, the "development of doctrine" is not and
could never be "free" from outside and governmental influences. Nor could
it ever effectively be constrained by such influences; after all, "[t]he human
desire for mental repose is not to be satisfied in this life."'24 One of the
challenges, then, for any polity that commits itself to religious freedom, is to
recognize, manage, and restrain these influences."'
Of course, for religious believers situated within particular communities
and traditions, the causes of those doctrinal changes that are acknowledged-
and, almost certainly, some will have to be acknowledged' 26-are not
123. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 86, at 273-74. Schuck notes:
This process of change [in immigrants' religious identities] ... is a two-way street. Even
as American religion alters the immigrants, the immigrants alter their religions, both in
the United States and abroad. American social and ideological conditions helped
liberalize the Catholic Church .... Similarly, Judaism was 'Americanized' during the
twentieth century, and much the same is occurring today with Islam, Hinduism,
Buddhism, and other world religions.
Id.; see also Thomas Bokenkotter, Democracy Meets Doctrine, AMERICA, Dec. 2, 2002, at 25, 27
(reviewing JAY P. DOLAN, IN SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM: A HISTORY OF RELIGION
AND CULTURE IN TENSION (2002)) (stating that Dolan "shows how the democratic impulse at times
exerted some pressures... on the American Catholic community," but noting also the "remarkable
way the Catholic Church largely resisted these pressures and maintained its monarchical governance
and distinctive traditions and identity in a country so enamored of individual freedom, so Protestant,
so imbued with prejudice against the papacy and so contemptuous of tradition"); cf. Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 103 (1952) (noting that "[Russian Orthodox] church members
already here [at the time of the Soviet revolution], immigrants and native-born... were accustomed
to our theory of separation between church and state" and stating that "[niaturally the growing
number of American-born members of the Russian Church did not cling to a hierarchy identified
with their country of remote origin with the same national feeling that moved their immigrant
ancestors").
124. Noonan, supra note 85, at 676.
125. See generally Mark E. Chopko, Shaping the Church: Overcoming the Twin Challenges of
Secularization and Scandal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 125 (2003).
126. Noonan, supra note 85, at 671 ("To deny that real change ... occur[s]... would be an
apologetic tactic incapable of execution and unworthy of belief.").
reducible simply to cultural, let alone political or legal, pressures. After all, to
be a religious believer is, among other things, to believe that one's faith, its
content, and its objects are more than artifacts, projections, or constructs.
Accordingly, my aim here is not to deny that authentic doctrinal
development is the result of clearer thinking, of new revelation, or of "deeper
insight."'27  That governments will sometimes want to, and state action
sometimes will, change religion's teachings does not mean that all such
changes are caused by government. Even sincere, deep, and abiding religious
commitments do not require one to dispute that law can inspire and shape
the development of doctrine. Such development, in other words, is rarely
"free," if by "free" one means "untouched by the aims and acts of
governments, courts, and laws."
Most generally, governments shape through law and otherwise the social
landscape and cultural environment--even the physical landscape and
neighborhoods' 28-in which religious communities and claims operate.
Governments provide incentives and disincentives, and wave carrots and
sticks, that influence our conduct, beliefs, and values. Governments collect
taxes, confer licenses, disburse benefits, create entitlements, and structure
expectations. They decide whether to allow usury, to recognize marriage, to
regulate abortion, and to impose the death penalty. In these and countless
other ways, law constructs the problems and poses the questions to which
religious believers, traditions, and doctrines respond. In so doing, laws and
governments shape the responses themselves.'29
Governments also persuade more subtly, through spending priorities,
through the availability and definition of regulatory exemptions, and through
conditions attached to public-welfare disbursements. 3 Governments affect
the development of doctrine when they refuse a tax-exemption to an
otherwise-eligible religiously affiliated college that discriminates on the basis
127. See John T. Noonan, Jr., On the Development of Doctrine, AMERICA, Apr. 3, 1999, at 6,
8. In a similar vein, as Andrew Koppelman reminded me, both at the Symposium of which this
Article is a part and in private conversation, that religious doctrine takes shape in cultural and
political contexts does not mean it is false. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 74, at 152 ("All
religious choices are always already made in a political context. Even hermits in the wilderness
got there by a process of socialization that led them to their religious convictions.").
128. See generally DOUGLAS RAE, CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END (2003).
129. See Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyrdom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1999)
("Religions necessarily negotiate their way through the non-religious world, and they are
inevitably changed as they do so.").
130. On the persuasive power of conditional spending, see, for example, Richard W.
Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2003). See also Tushnet, supra note 129, at 1119.
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of race'31 or to a church that crosses a state-defined line between the spheres
of religion and electioneering.'32 It would be implausible to maintain that
governments are meddling in "matters of purely ecclesiastical concern" '
when they refuse to contract out construction projects, social services, and
education to firms, agencies, and schools whose practices are inconsistent
with their moral and other commitments. In the end, whether one embraces
a reductionist view of religion or believes instead as an article of faith that
truth is discovered and expresses itself through religious doctrine in ways
appropriate to the times, it seems unlikely that doctrine does, or even could,
develop "free" from state action and from the effects of law.
Additionally, many prominent scholars today emphasize that law is
both expressive.. and didactic.'35 Law is more than a set of duly promul-
131. See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Garnett, supra
note 15; Bradley, supra note -, at 1068-71.
132. On this point, Professor Lee has quipped that the tax exemption is the government's
way of paying churches not to talk about certain things. Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God;
When God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clinton
Administration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 391, 434 ("Section
501(c)(3) ... pays churches through tax-exempt status to be silent on issues deemed by the state
to be political."); cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 102
(Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Women's Contraception Equity Act as an
"intentional, purposeful, intrusion into a religious organization's expression of its tenets" and
insisting that "[t]he government is not accidentally or incidentally interfering with religious
practice; it is doing so willfully by making a judgment about what is or is not religious").
133. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
134. For more on "legal expressivism," see, for example, Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard
H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000);
Symposium, The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action, 60 MD. L. REV. 465 (2001). The
observation here that law is "expressive" is not intended to stake any particular claim in the
ongoing debates over the content and merits of "expressivism," but only to make the fairly
pedestrian point that "law has an expressive dimension-it conveys meanings, sends messages."
Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506, 510
(2001); cf. id. at 507. That said, as Smith observes:
The notion of an "expressivist jurisprudence".. . is initially puzzling in the same way that
calls for a "vocal theory of opera" or a "visual account of painting" would be puzzling. It
seems plain enough that law "expresses," or that it conveys "meanings"; that is just the way
law quite obviously works. Law is not like a bully or a bulldozer that can just do things
sullenly and through brute force; at its core, law is constituted by words, sentences,
arguments, imperatives-by things that mean. If law did not convey meanings it would be
impotent; or rather, it would not be law.
Id.
135. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(observing that "[o]ur expectations ... are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the
customs and values of the past and present," and that "[s]ince it is the task of the law to form and
project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and
risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society"); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled [sic] if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the
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gated rules, and it produces more than an array of rewards and punishments.
It embodies, conveys, and is intended to inculcate claims about how we ought
to live together and toward which ends we ought to move. It aims not only
to control, but also to form, through instruction, persuasion, and example,
those to whom it is addressed and to whom it applies.
Professor Koppelman has noted that the "most obvious way" the gov-
ernment "expresses an opinion" is "through the passage of legislation. In this
arena, the government has available to it a particularly powerful type of
symbolic conduct that is unavailable to other actors."'' 6 But there are other
ways that law speaks and teaches. For instance, Professor Levinson, in his
thoughtful monograph on public monuments, explores the persuasive power
of both symbolic and explicit government expression.137 There, joining many
other scholars and commentators,' 3' he fixes his sights squarely on the
"quixotic" notion that governments, in their expressive capacities, can be
"neutral." He refuses to "anathema[tize] ... the state's active tilting on behalf
of a particular vision of how best to live one's life.' ' 39 In fact, he insists, the
state unavoidably and understandably does "honor" and "celebrate" some
views and not others. Like religious believers, communities, and institutions,
governments are "active participant[s] in the intellectual marketplace," and
their influence is unavoidable if not irresistible.
There is much more that is worth saying about the rich and complex
problem of "government speech,'' about related matters such as the "view-
point neutrality" rules pronounced and enforced in the Court's free-speech
cases,42 and about the "endorsement" test often applied in cases involving
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.").
See generally M. Cathleen Kaveny, Autonomy, Solidarity and Law's Pedagogy, 27 LOUVAIN STUD.
339, 349-53 (2002) (exploring the role of "law as moral teacher").
136. Koppelman, supra note 74, at 111.
137. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES (1998).
138. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 26, at 636, 639 (insisting that "government inevitably will
endorse and in that sense prescribe some beliefs" and that "many of the most revered events and
chapters in our constitutional tradition have resulted directly from [the] practice" of "endorsing and
promoting particular beliefs over others"); cf. Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy:
A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003) (insisting, inter alia, that Justice
Jackson's opinion in Barnette can reasonably be understood as advocating an entirely defensible
principle against "expressly religious" public orthodoxy).
139. LEVINSON, supra note 137, at 77, 78.
140. Id. at 79.
141. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000); Abner
S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001).
142. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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public religious displays and expression.' For now, it is sufficient to under-
score the point that government regulation, spending, and speech work in
and through culture to shape the beliefs of persons and the commitments of
religious and other communities. Such state actions prompt and participate
both in the general "transformation" of religious sensibilities and, more
specifically, in the development of particular religious doctrines.
It is not only positive legal prohibitions, conditional government
spending, and symbolic state expression that complicate the "free
development" account; judge-made legal doctrines do as well. These doctrines,
particularly those generated by courts interpreting the First Amendment,
construct the pathways along and through which governments may act. They
guide religious communities' decisions and lawyers' advice. For example, the
Court's controversial decision in Employment Division v. Smith' allows
governments to impose burdens on religiously motivated practices, and on
compliance with duties expressed in religious doctrine, as long as these
burdens are imposed via facially neutral, generally applicable laws. The Free
Exercise Clause is understood, then, to allow legislators to increase the "costs"
of complying with certain doctrines, thereby creating an incentive for
religious communities to remove or relieve those costs by revising those
doctrines. 4s To be sure, Smith and other recent cases do not permit legislators
to "single out" religious believers or practices, because they are religious, for
such burdens,'46 but we are not yet talking about state action aimed
specifically at causing changes in religious teachings as such. Whatever the
merits of Smith's general-applicability and facial-neutrality requirements,'47
current free exercise doctrine not only permits legislative action to affect, but
also can itself affect, the content of religious doctrine. 8
A corollary, or implication, of the Smith rule is that religiously
grounded exemptions from laws or legislative accommodations for those
who might otherwise be burdened by them are not constitutionally required.
143. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-83
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
144. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
145. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
146. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000).
147. Compare Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandings of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1990), with Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise
Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFsTRA L. REV. 245 (1991), Frederick Mark
Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 555 (1998), and Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992).
148. See generally Carmella, supra note 107.
1674 51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1645 (2004)
The Development of Doctrine 1675
Governments are permitted to exempt religious believers from otherwise
applicable, burdensome laws,"49 but such accommodations are a matter of
grace: Whether these exemptions exist and what relief they provide are
details to be worked out in the legislative arena, through the political proc-
ess.150  Even a willing legislature's ability to accommodate or exempt
religiously motivated practice is constrained by doctrines that forbid the
singling out of religion for special benefits.' One upshot of all this, of course,
is that some religious practices will be accommodated and others will not."'
Some state-imposed burdens on compliance with some religious obligations,
and on living in accord with certain religious doctrines, will be lifted and
others will not. Some burdens will strike majorities and legislators as calling
for exemptions, and some doctrines giving rise to the burdened practices will
seem worthy of accommodation, but others will not.'53 As the recent
149. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) ("This Court has
long recognized that the government may... accommodate religious practices and that it may do so
without violating the Establishment Clause." (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)). But see City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that an "exemption" for religious practice provided by the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional because "the statute has provided the
Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain," and insisting that "[tihis
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First
Amendment"); Steven B. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITt. L. REV. 75 (1990). See generally
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); McConnell, supra note 146.
150. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). As was stated in Smith:
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First
Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed
word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief
can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.
Id. See generally William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political Actors in Accommodation of Religion, 22 U.
HAW. L. REV. 403 (2000).
151. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). See generally McConnell, supra note
146, at 41 (noting current Supreme Court doctrine that, "in the discretion of the legislature, religious
exercise may be exempted from neutral and generally applicable laws if, but only if, the accommodation
is 'designed to alleviate government intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of a particular
faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause,' and would not 'have the effect of "inducing"
religious belief" (footnotes omitted)).
152. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715-18 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing
concern that one particular religious group was singled out for special accommodation by the legislature).
But see id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (objecting to a suggestion in majority opinion that "an
accommodation for a particular religious group is invalid because of the risk that the legislature will not
grant the same accommodation to another religious group suffering some similar burden" and noting that
"[tihis rationale... [is] ... without grounding in our precedents and a needless restriction upon the
legislature's ability to respond to the unique problems of a particular religious group").
153. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 129, at 1119 (insisting that "[c]hanges induced by the availability of
accommodations are no different, and no more troubling, than changes induced by the existence of
television or automobiles").
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Catholic Charities decision illustrates, those accommodations that emerge from
the legislative process might not track-and, indeed, could very well
undermine or insult-the religious commitments and obligations burdened
by the law.'54
The "no religious decisions" principle itself is, oddly enough, another
example of a religious-doctrine-shaping cluster of rules. 5 Along with several
other similar doctrines-for example, the "entanglement" portion of the
Court's Lemon test and the prohibition on delegating public power to religious
officials-the rule requiring courts to abstain from adjudicating disagreements
over religious doctrine, even when those disagreements arise in the context of
otherwise garden-variety legal disputes, can have the perhaps unexpected effect
of influencing the development and shaping the content of that doctrine. On
the one hand, some have argued that cases like Hull Church protect entrenched
religious authorities and their decisions, not only from intrusive external
second-guessing, but also from internal challenges."6 The "no religious
decisions" rule is seen by some as working to the disadvantage of dissenters
advocating developments or changes in certain teachings.
Hull Church is a reminder, then, that a rule that defers to established
religious authorities, to the possible detriment of dissenters, does not neces-
sarily stifle doctrinal change or shore up traditional teachings. On the other
hand, as Professor Levine has emphasized, the courts' "hands off' approach to
religious-doctrine questions can also make it more difficult for religious
communities to fend off ersatz developments and inauthentic innovations."7
Courts' refusal to evaluate even the most outlandish claim about religious
teaching, or to interpret even the most straightforward doctrinal statement,
may have the ironic effect of hamstringing these communities' efforts to
persist.
Now, to recall that state actions-for example, government speech,
public spending, legislative enactments, judicially crafted doctrine, and so
on-influence not only the behavior and beliefs of religious people, but also
the substance and development of religious doctrine, is not to say that such
actions are designed to force such changes or are animated by any "invidious"
intent. It is not to suggest that such actions are invalid, or even suspect.
They are, again, inevitable. Nor is it to disagree with Justice Brennan's basic
point in Hull Church that disabling the government's courts from
154. See generally Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
155. On the "no religious decisions" principle, see supra Part I.
156. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 20, at 1403, 1427, 1470; J. Brant, Religion in the Workplace, 4
EMPLOYEE RIGHT & EMP. POL'Y J. 87, 106--09 (2000).
157. See Levine, supra note 82, at 87, 113-15.
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interpreting religious texts and claims is good law, sound policy, and protects
religious freedom in important ways. It is merely to observe that doctrinal
development is not ever really "free" in any strong sense.
We can say with confidence-and without wading too far into deep and
difficult theological waters-that religious doctrine develops. This is not
reductionism. It is merely an appropriate qualification of Justice Brennan's
statement, and a recognition that religion takes form in cultures and contexts
shaped by law. To acknowledge as much is not-at least, not yet-to say
anything about the ambitions of secular governments or the vulnerability of
religious freedom.
Sometimes, however, doctrinal change is in the interest of secular, lib-
eral, democratic governments, and accordingly, such governments will want
to change-not necessarily to repress or punish, only to change-religious
doctrine. Sometimes, such governments will quite understandably want not
only to endorse and express messages that conflict with those of some or
many religions, and not only to change the minds and shape the values of
citizens, but also to bring about revisions in religions' teachings. The purpose
of these efforts is not merely to affect the behavior of religious believers,
without regard to the origins of the views and habits in which that behavior
might be rooted. Rather, it is to work a specific modification in the
expression and teaching of religious institutions and traditions.
And so, turn now from what might be the unremarkable observation
that the development and content of religious doctrines, like the beliefs and
practices of religious persons, are shaped in many ways by state action to
what is probably a more jarring claim, namely, that governments like ours
sometimes act for the purpose of changing religious teachings. In other
words, sometimes, promoting heterodoxy is policy.
It seems strange even to consider the notion of government policies aimed
at causing modification to the tenets of a particular faith. Indeed, it would
appear that, such policies and aims are textbook examples of what our
governments may not do. Certainly, the overwhelming weight of the relevant
case law and commentary is to this effect. After all, to identify a theological
proposition-as a theological proposition-as in need of change, or to set the
public sights on a doctrinal claim-as a doctrinal claim-is certainly to take
"cognizance" of religion. '  True, as Justice Goldberg once emphasized,
"[g]overnment must inevitably take cognizance of the existence of religion and,
158. See Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprnted in Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 64 (1947) ("We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.").
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indeed, under certain circumstances the First Amendment may require that it
do so.""' Yet, this kind of "cognizance," which goes well beyond the notice
inevitably involved in efforts to exempt religiously motivated practices from
particular regulatory burdens, seems dramatically out of place in our tradition
of church-state separation. 6°
However, many examples are available, and many more are certainly
imaginable, of past and present government policies that can fairly be charac-
terized as directed to produce changes in religious teaching.'61 For example:
In 1890, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints abandoned
polygamy, or "plural marriage," a practice the Church had sanctioned since
1852, when Brigham Young "proclaimed that Mormons believed in and




In 1896, Utah was admitted to the Union on the condition that its
constitution provide that polygamy was "forever prohibited.' ' 63 A review of
the conflict between the United States and Utah--or, more accurately,
between the United States and the Mormon Church-over polygamy reveals
that this was not simply a case where a generally applicable and religion-
neutral marriage policy had the perhaps foreseeable but unintended
consequence of burdening religiously motivated practice. Rather, it appears
that the federal government designed and implemented policy with the aim
of changing the Church's doctrines and beliefs, not only to constrain conduct
to which the government objected, but also to reduce what the United States
saw as the dissonance between the values, worldview, and loyalties of
Mormons and those of an ascendant American nationalism. 64
159. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); see also Vincent Blasi, Essay, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 783, 789 (2002) ("[A] no-cognizance
principle is a practical impossibility in the modem welfare state, or for that matter even in the
minimal state of Madison's day.").
160. On separationism as a "tradition," see, for example, Steven D. Smith, Separation as a
Tradition, 18 J.L. &POL. 215 (2002).
161. To characterize these policies in this way is not to presume or argue that any particular
doctrinal movement would necessarily be regarded as the product of state (as opposed to divine or
community) action by someone standing within a particular religious tradition, or even that it would
be regarded as a "development" at all (as opposed to, say, a new articulation of traditional teaching,
an instance of "inculturation," etc.).
162. See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1 (2002). The Supreme Court
had ruled in 1878 that Congress had the power to prohibit, and the First Amendment permitted
Congress to outlaw, polygamy in the Territory of Utah. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
163. Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107 (1894).
164. Again, that it was the goal of government policy to change the Church's doctrine, and
that the Church's doctrine on plural marriage in fact changed, does not mean that the doctrine
changed because of government policy, rather than because of a new and divine revelation, as the
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One could also point to many episodes in American history where it
was a policy goal of various governments to induce changes in the teachings
of the Roman Catholic Church-or, at least, of the Roman Catholic
Church in America-and thereby to "Americanize" practicing Catholics.
For at least a century, and particularly during the 1870s, 1920s, and 1940s,
it was unremarkable in respectable public-policy and political-theory
debates for participants to express worries about the insufficiently democ-
ratic character of Catholicism and to endorse measures aimed at reforming
that character.1 65 Also, a number of tax- and incorporation-related measures
were proposed during the latter parts of the nineteenth century, whose
purpose was to undermine the power and voice of the Catholic Church's
allegedly foreign and undemocratic hierarchy by forcing changes in how the
Church governed and organized itself.'66 These policies were animated not
merely by the hope that Catholic citizens would become more American, but
also by the more ambitious goal of influencing the messages that these
citizens received from their Church.
In the present day, revelations about sexual abuse by Catholic priests
have prompted calls for increased government supervision not only of the
Church's responses to allegations of abuse, but also of the Church's training
Church today teaches. For another discussion of the Americanization of Mormonism, and of
government efforts to prompt it, see, for example, R. LAURENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICANS 25-47 (1986). See also Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as
if Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice Brennan, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1059 (1999).
165. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002);
JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY (2003); Hamburger,
supra note 71. McGreevy notes, inter alia, that Congress passed a law denying aid to schools in
New Mexico when it was still a territory precisely to counter the territory's predominant
Catholicism, MCGREEVY, supra, at 117, that Michigan enacted a church-property bill in 1855 to
"check[ ] the power of the Catholic bishops," id. at 62, and so on.
The conclusion of an 1854 decision in Maine, affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a
15-year old girl who was expelled from her public school for refising to read the King James version
of the Bible, illustrates vividly these concerns. After stating that "[tihe education of the people
is... a matter of public concern, and of... paramount importance," the court went on to note that:
Large masses of foreign population are among us, weak in the midst of our strength. Mere
citizenship is of no avail, unless they imbibe the liberal spirit of our laws and institutions,
unless they become citizens in fact as well as in name. In no other way can the process of
assimilation be so readily and thoroughly accomplished as through the medium of the
public schools.
Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 391, 413 (1854).
For more detailed discussions of the connections between the Common School movement and
the various no-aid Amendments, on the one hand, and nineteenth (and twentieth) century nativism
and anti-Catholicism, on the other, see CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON
SCHOOL (1988); HAMBURGER, supra; LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC
SCHOOL, 1825-1925 (1987); MCGREEVY, supra.
166. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 165, at 287-334; Hamburger, supra note 71.
ordaining of priests, hearkening back to some of the Middle Ages' most
dramatic secular-religious conflicts.1 67  The Attorney General of
Massachusetts, Thomas Reilly, raised eyebrows when he appeared to endorse
the idea of government supervision of the Catholic Church's internal reforms
and to suggest that the state could and should dictate the content of those
reforms.'68 As one prominent lawyer-the General Counsel for the United
States Counsel of Catholic's Bishops-put it, "the current scandal over the
response to sexual abuse only serves to accelerate [an] existing trend toward
shaping the Catholic Church to the prevailing culture, through litigation and
legislation or regulatory action."' 69
We might also look to the many and proliferating statements in recent
years by political leaders and commentators, and by Muslim believers and
scholars,17° concerning the need to encourage, as a matter of public policy
(and also to defend, as a matter of theology) the development and ascen-
dancy of a "moderate" version of Islam that is presumably more friendly to
pluralism, markets, and secularism.' Whether such statements and proposals
167. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
168. See Silverglate, supra note 22; see also Patrick J. Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual
Misconduct Litigation on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2003). Certainly, an appropriate
treatment of clerical sexual abuse and the challenge of preventing and punishing it is well beyond the
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, some reactions to the clergy-abuse crisis serve as examples of
proposed policies whose ends include encouraging revisions to the Catholic Church's structure and
doctrine.
169. Mark E. Chopko, Shaping the Church: Overcoming the Twin Challenges of Secularization and
Scandal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 132 (2003) (footnote omitted).
170. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 20. See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD
AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1990); KHALED ABoU EL FADL, THE PLACE OF TOLERANCE IN ISLAM (Joshua Cohen & Ian Lague
eds., 2002).
171. See NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC
DEMOCRACY (2003); Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, War of Ideas, Part 1, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004,
at A33 ("We cannot change other societies and cultures on our own. But we also can't just do
nothing .... What we can do is partner with the forces of moderation within these societies to help
them fight the war of ideas."); LaShawn R. Jefferson, The War on Women, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,
2002, at A12 ("The international community must pressure governments to reform criminal laws and
strengthen secular justice systems so that the rule of law applies across society. Civil societies must be
strengthened, and local women's groups that are pushing for reform should be supported."); Ron
Moreau et al., Holy War 101, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 2003, at 28, 29 (describing concerns of American
and Pakistani governments about teaching in radical Muslim schools (madrassas) and government
efforts to reform them); Fareed Zakaria, We Need To Get the Queen Bees, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 2003,
at 33 (quoting Lee Kuan Yew's claim that "[m]oderate, modernizing Muslims, political, religious,
civic leaders together have to make the case against the fundamentalists" and that "modernizers must
feel that the U.S. and its allies will provide the resources, energy and support to make them
winners"); cf. Ian Buruma, Killing Iraq with Kindness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, at A25 (warning
that "history shows that the forceful imposition of even decent ideas in the claim of universalism
tends to backfire" and asking "whether the cause of moderate Muslims is helped by the
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are viewed as efforts to strengthen the "true" meaning and teachings of Islam
in the face of fundamentalist and inauthentic doctrines, or as attempts to
throw the weight of American policy behind reformers and dissenters whose
goal is to revise and liberalize, without abandoning, their faith tradition, the
point is the same: Our government perceives that it has, and so is acting to
advance, a "secular" interest in the content and development of Muslim
teaching, both as a means of shaping the behavior and dispositions of those
who receive, accept, and profess Islam, and as a way of coaxing the content of
a rival nomos in a more America-friendly direction. And it is not simply that
America and many European nations are hoping that Muslims will assimilate
themselves to their Western homes and neighbors, or even to the values
ascribed to the "world community." Rather, these nations arguably seek to
assimilate, or to remake, Islam itself.'
In sum, the "development of doctrine" will rarely be "free" from the
indirect influence, if not the specific attention, of secular, liberal, constitu-
tional governments. What is more, we can expect that such governments
will sometimes legislate, speak, and spend for the purpose of changing a
religion's teachings and message. Governments like ours have tried and will
try to act, regulate, spend, and speak in ways that move the substantive
content of religious doctrine in a direction and toward conclusions that these
governments endorse. To be sure, this claim runs counter to much of what
we are accustomed to saying and thinking about limited government and
church-state separationism. It seems in glaring contrast to, for example,
Justice Brennan's statement in Hull Church that the "development of
revolutionary war that has been set off by the American and British armies"); Christopher Dickey &
Carla Power, Rethinking Islam, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 2003, at 50, 51 (quoting exiled Muslim
"reformer," Rachid Ghannouchi: "[Washington] would like to change Islam, secularize it.... It wants
to promote Islam without Sharia... and without jihad... the right to defend ourselves."); Noah
Feldman, Editorial, A New Democracy, Enshrined in Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at A31
(stating that "[ilt would be .. .futile for the United States to unilaterally impose secularization in
Afghanistan and Iraq").
172. See, e.g., Barbara Amiel, Muslims Have Just As Much to Fear From Militant Islam, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 24, 2003, at 18 ("If the problem is militant Islam, the solution is moderate Islam."
(quoting Daniel Pipes)); Francis Fukuyama & Nadav Samin, Can Any Good Come of Radical Islam?,
OPINION J., Sept. 12, 2002 (stating that "the great need now is for Western-oriented Muslims to take
advantage of the turmoil created by September 11 to promote a more genuinely liberal form of their
religion"); Jefferson, supra note 171 (warning that the United States should be as concerned about
the consequences of certain "radical interpretations of Islamic law, or Shariah" that "subordinate and
exclude women," as about "combating terrorism emerging from militants in the Islamic world";
asserting that "[i]mmediate reform of the aspects of Shariah that deny women equality under law and
in practice is needed"; and contending that "[there are varying interpretations among Islamic jurists
about whether these applications are correct, but they are grossly unfair to women, antithetical to
human-rights principles, and should be reformed").
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doctrine" is a religious, or "ecclesiastical," matter in which secular governments
therefore have no interest. Thus, whatever this statement's prescriptive or
normative merits, it certainly fails as a descriptive matter.
IV. DECLARING RELIGIOUS TRUTH? THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
STATE'S INTEREST IN RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE
So far, I have identified a phenomenon-that is, the "development of
doctrine"-and established that governments often do act in ways that do
and are designed to influence such development. That this is so should come
as no surprise. And yet, the image of state officials and government
policymakers gathered together and designing a strategy to induce changes in
those religious teachings to which they object is unsettling. Government
action implementing such a strategy seems almost the paradigmatic example
of what is and should be forbidden by the First Amendment. This is not the
place for a detailed and perhaps quixotic discussion of the First Amendment's
original meaning or animating principles, or for a reexamination of the
disputes about what those who drafted and ratified the First Amendment
meant or were understood to mean when they proscribed federal laws
"respecting an establishment of religion."'73 Instead, my aim here is to flesh
out and test the intuition that doctrine-targeting state action is, or should be,
constitutionally suspect.
The provisions of our Constitution dealing with religion and religious
expression generate a variety of norms, principles, values, presumptions, tests,
and prohibitions." 4 And we can be reasonably confident that any court
would find a way, using one or another of the available tools, to invalidate
state action that was framed explicitly as an effort to change a religion's
teachings.'75 First, it is "beyond dispute" that governments in the United
States may not compel worship, prayer, or participation in clearly religious
activities, and also that the state could never require or punish affirmations
(or recantations) of religious faith.'76 But such clumsy moves are not the kind
173. 1 am inclined to embrace Professor Smith's argument that the Establishment Clause is best
understood as a "jurisdictional" provision. See SMITH, supra note 8; see also Douglas G. Smith, The
Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate Law?, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 239 (2003).
174. See generally VOLOKH, supra note 10, at 667-69; TRIBE, supra note 10, ch. 14.
175. But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
176. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) ("It is beyond dispute that ... the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion
or its exercise."); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also Act for Religious Freedom
Recited, VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (2003) (enacted 1786) ("[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent
or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever .... ").
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of state efforts under consideration here. It is also probable that any policy
designed to prompt development in religious doctrine would conflict with one or
another versions of the "neutrality" that the Religion Clause and the First
Amendment more generally are thought to require."' However, an objection
based on "neutrality" is nonresponsive, because the claim is precisely that
government is not, cannot be, and probably should not be "neutral" with respect
to the content of religious doctrine. The sorts of state action that might usefully
be evaluated under a "neutrality" standard-for example, a school-voucher
program, or a generally applicable criminal law-are different in kind from those
being addressed in this Article.
In addition, official efforts of the kind hypothesized here could violate
the "no religious decisions" rule set out in Hull Church and similar cases."'
After all, it is bedrock law that "government is not a judge of religious truth"
and "parliaments are not to play the theologian." '79 However, Hull Church
and cases like it speak to situations where, in the course of resolving an
otherwise cognizable dispute, a secular court is asked to interpret, apply, or
enforce religious tenets or obligations, as defined by the relevant religious
authority. As I mentioned earlier, the courts' "hands off" approach to these
cases reflects a concern that, for lack of competence, civil judges will "get it
wrong," thereby interfering with the autonomy of religious institutions and
with the right of religious authorities to decide what their religion means.
This fear is enhanced by the prediction that mistaken interpretations--or
even correct ones-will interfere with what Justice Brennan called the "free
development of doctrine."
177. For a detailed taxonomy of the ways the Court has employed the concept of "neutrality"
in Religion Clause cases, particularly public-funding cases, see, for example, Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 878-99 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally Brownstein, supra note 90, at 186;
Laycock, supra note 15, at 1002.
178. See also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 699, 709 (1976) ("[Tlhis
case essentially involves.., a religious dispute the resolution of which under our cases is for
ecclesiastical and not civil tribunals."); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 108 (1952)
("Should the state assert power to change the statute requiring conformity to ancient faith and
doctrine to one establishing a different doctrine, the invalidity would be unmistakable."); Dixon v.
Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 714 (4th Cit. 2002) (observing, inter alia, that "the civil courts of our
country are obliged to play a limited role in resolving church disputes," so long as they "can be
decided without resolving an ecclesiastical controversy").
179. MURRAY, supra note 101, at 75; see also id. at xi (noting that the freedom of religion
includes "the freedom of the churches to maintain their own different identities, as defined by
themselves. I take it that every church claims this freedom to define itself, and claims too the
consequent right to reject definition at the hands of any secular authority."); id. at 70 ("In contrast to
the Jacobin system in all its forms, the American Constitution does not presume to define the
Church or in any way to supervise her exercise of authority in pursuit of her own distinct ends. The
Church is entirely free to define herself ... ").
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In the kind of scenario imagined here, though, the government's pur-
pose is not to interpret or enforce religious doctrine, or to "get doctrine
right." Accordingly, the salient danger is not so much that a judge will "get
it wrong," thereby intruding on church autonomy and throwing a wrench in
the works of "free" doctrinal development. Rather, the government's
purpose is to engineer the adoption of a different religious message; the
point is precisely to cause development and change. Given this aim, concerns
about secular officials' competence in theological interpretation and exegesis
seem largely beside the point. That the government might attempt to under-
stand, but in fact misinterpret, a religion's doctrine is not the danger against
which the Religion Clause's "no religious decisions" principle guards. Rather,
the concern is that state officials and courts act ultra vires when they purport
to resolve conflicts implicating or arising out of doctrinal disputes, or to use
secular power to shore up one side of a doctrinal dispute. This concern is not
implicated, however, in a hypothetical situation where the government attempts
to bring about a change in religious doctrine that would bring that doctrine into
conformity with its own interests and values. In such a situation, the
important question is whether the government has correctly identified its
own interests and values, which it desires religious teachings to reflect or
support, and has prudently designed a doctrine-changing strategy that is likely
to advance those interests and promote those values.
Another concern underlying the Hull Church line of cases is that govern-
ment efforts to interpret and enforce religious doctrine-even if state actors "get
it right" (as those courts in the United States and elsewhere that interpreted
religious doctrine in the past clearly did, from time to time)-interfere with the
autonomy of religious communities and the sanctity of believers' consciences.
However, while a commitment to any plausible version of religious freedom
should require opposition to such interferences, it is not clear that state-
instigated developments of doctrine necessarily involve them. An official
effort to bring about a revision in doctrine need not be coercive, and need not
involve intrusive second-guessing or oversight of a religious community's
internal workings. The goal, remember, is persuasion and transformation, not
overt subjugation. The state's efforts are aimed at changing the doctrinal
expression of religions, and do not directly target the beliefs and values of
individuals. Of course, the reason for wanting a change in religious doctrine
is to secure the change's "downstream effects," that is, citizens with state-
endorsed commitments. Further, as Professor Koppelman reminds us, "[all
religious choices are always already made in a political context. Even hermits
in the wilderness got there by a process of socialization that led them to their
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religious convictions."'" Thus, that the government acts to shape that context,
knowing and intending that its actions and that context might prompt or shape
doctrinal development, does not seem to raise freedom-of-conscience or
church-autonomy concerns.
Another component of contemporary Religion Clause jurisprudence is
worth considering in more detail: All state action must have a "secu-
lar ... purpose.''. Perhaps because this idea is so foundational, government
actions have only rarely been invalidated by the Supreme Court for lacking
such a purpose.' Nevertheless, the Court ruled that an Arkansas law ban-
ning the teaching of evolution in public schools and universities lacked such
a purpose because the law was supported by no "considerations of state
policy" other than the "religious views of some of its citizens."'83 The Court
also struck down a Kentucky statute requiring schools to post copies of the
Ten Commandments, insisting that the law's purpose was "plainly reli-
gious.' ' s4  In Wallace v. Jaffree,' the Court concluded that Alabama's
moment-of-silence law, which mandated such a moment "for meditation or
voluntary prayer," lacked any secular purpose.' 6  And in Edwards v.
Aguillard,87 the Justices disapproved Louisiana's decision to require equal
treatment of evolution and-creation science in schools. 8
Some applications of this rule have reasonably been criticized as
scattershot and outcome driven. And its contours and bounds can
reasonably be debated. In the end, though, it is descriptively accurate to
say that "[a] world without the secular purpose requirement would be so
strange as to be nearly unrecognizable."'8 9  As Professor Koppelman has
observed, the requirement that laws have a secular purpose, notwith-
standing its several flaws, "follows directly from a principle at the core of
the Establishment Clause: that government may not declare religious
180. Koppelman, supra note 74, at 152.
181. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
182. Professor Koppelman notes that "the cases in which the challenged statute survives the
[secular purpose] prong vastly outnumber those in which the Court invalidates the statute."
Koppelman, supra note 74, at 97.
183. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); see also id. at 103 (evolution is
"proscribe[d] for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine;
that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group").
184. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam).
185. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
186. Id. at 58-59.
187. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
188. Id. at 592 (concluding that the legislative history revealed a plan to "change the
science curriculum of public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a particular
religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in its entirety").
189. Koppelman, supra note 74, at 166.
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truth."'" That is, "the First Amendment ... is, among other things, a
restriction on government speech. It means that the state may not declare
articles of faith. The state may not express an opinion about religious
matters. It may not encourage citizens to hold certain religious beliefs. '191
In addition, "[t]he state simply is not permitted to take an official position
on matters of religion, ' nor may it communicate such a position via legis-
lation, symbolic conduct, or expression.
Professor Koppelman has provided a detailed and powerful rehabilitation
and defense of the "secular purpose" requirement. Assuming, then, the
existence and wisdom of such a constitutional rule, is it offended by state action
and expression aimed at changing religious teaching-that is, by government
conduct that has a purpose, and not merely an effect, of changing, revising, or
pushing the evolution of doctrine? Would such efforts by government run
afoul of the rule that public officials and actors not "declare religious truth"?
In a way, the secular-purpose requirement is a prescriptive restatement of
Justice Brennan's descriptive observation that doctrine and its development are
matters of "purely ecclesiastical concern," in which "secular interests" are not
and should not be "implicat[edl."'94 However, it is surely the case that plausible
and powerful "secular" reasons exist for government to want particular religions
to revise or abandon particular tenets, and that policies designed to satisfy this
want would therefore have a "secular" purpose. For example, our government
has a "secular" interest in bringing about a change in the racist doctrine of the
World Church of the Creator (WCC), now known as the "Creativity
Movement." A "development" in that Church's "doctrine" would not, in fact,
be a matter of only "ecclesiastical" concern.9  Remember, that the
government's interests and reasons are "secular" does not mean that they are
pedestrian, procedural, or couched strictly in terms of policy mechanics. On
the contrary, such "secular" reasons are highly normative, value-laden, and
even "moral."'
96
190. Id. at 89; see also id. at 108 (observing that it is an "Establishment Clause [aixiom" that
the "Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth").
191. Id. at 109 (citing, inter alia, Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) and
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1994)).
192. Id. at 111.
193. Id. at 110-11.
194. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
195. According to the Antidefamation League, the World Church of the Creator is one of the
Nation's "fastest-growing hate groups." The Church "is a racial religion whose prime goal is the
survival, expansion and advancement of the White Race." See ADL Backgrounder: World Church
of the Creator, at http://www.adl.org/backgrounders/wcotc.asp (July 6, 1999).
196. See generally Steven D. Smith, The "Secular," the "Religious," and the "Moral": What Are
We Talking About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 487 (2001).
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A "no religious decisions" purist might object at this point that the
government's interest-its "secular," albeit moral, purpose-in the content
and development of the WCC's doctrine would be better served by prohi-
bitions on racist threats by particular speakers, by punishing racism-motivated
violence by particular actors, and by antiracist counterspeech than by policies
inducing doctrinal development. Yes, the argument goes, the government
clearly may and should act to deter, punish, and redress conduct that is
inspired by the Church's racist doctrine.'97 It may and should try to persuade
Church members and others to reject such doctrine through symbolic
endorsement of antiracism and other means. Such actions do not require
public officials to "declare religious truth" or to "play the theologian."'98
Instead, these actions target the behavior and beliefs of individuals for
change, not the teachings of religious communities, associations, and
traditions. But if there is a "secular purpose" that justifies state actions aimed
both at shaping citizens' beliefs and regulating these beliefs' undesirable
manifestations in conduct, it is hard to see why that same purpose could not
justify similar actions aimed at the expression, or "doctrine," of associations
and traditions that instill, spread, and nurture such beliefs. That is, if there is
a "secular" government interest in encouraging citizens to believe some
things and not others, then there seems to be a similar interest in wanting
religions to teach some things and not others.
What, then, about the attractive axiom that "government may not
declare religious truth"?'99 Set aside for now the difficulty in crafting a sharp
distinction-one that does not itself depend on assumptions that are, in the
end, theological-between "religious truth" and "secular values" or "moral
commitments."" A reasonable response to an objection grounded on this
axiom might be that government action or expression aimed not just at
countering the racist message of the WCC, but also and more particularly at
bringing about a revision in that message, is not an effort to "declare religious
truth." It is, instead, an effort to undermine the government's competition in
the citizen-formation game by arranging for a rival source of meaning to
abandon its own toxic message and to embrace, as religious truth, the message
preferred by the state. It is an attempt to induce the Church to "declare" as
197. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995)
("While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free
to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging
a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.").
198. See Koppelman, supra note 74, at 89; MURRAY, supra note 101, at 75.
199. Koppelman, supra note 74, at 89.
200. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 196.
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"religious truth" what the state happens also to embrace as "secular," civic
truth. The government could say, if called to account, "We are not declaring
religious truth. You are right-that is not our business. We are simply trying,
through policy and lawmaking, to get this religious group to conform the
content of its religious doctrine to public values, and to our (entirely secular)
orthodoxy."
"Orthodoxy"? The game is up! Justice Jackson, remember, conceded in
the flag-salute case that "[n]ational unity [is] an end which officials may foster
by persuasion and example," but nonetheless warned that "[clompulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard..... He
went on to proclaim, in ringing terms and with characteristic flair:
[FIreedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.' °2
These words, widely thought to belong "among the great paeans to human
liberty,""2 3 might seem to set our Constitution irrevocably against any ambi-
tious doctrine-revision agenda. "There is," after all, "no mysticism in the
American concept of the State"; "[a]uthority here," Justice Jackson insisted,
"is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority."2" In
the end, however, Barnette's sweeping "no orthodoxy" proclamation can
hardly be taken seriously as a description of how our government actually
acts.05  Indeed, Professor Smith has written that Jackson's words
"committed [us] to a course of massive collective delusion," "one that
201. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943).
202. Id. at 642; see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872) ("The law
knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.");
cf. MURRAY, supra note 101, at 85 ("We will tolerate all kinds of ideas, however pernicious; but we
will not tolerate the idea of an orthodoxy. That is, we refuse to say, as a people: There are truths,
and we hold them, and these are the truths.").
203. GLENDON SCHUBERT, DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE JUDICIAL
OPINIONS OF ROBERT H. JACKSON 34 (1969).
204. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
205. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 138. Professor Koppelman contends that Barnette's "no
orthodoxy" claim can be salvaged by limiting its application to "expressly religious" orthodoxy. In
Professor Smith's view, though, this rehabilitation project fails. See Smith, supra note 26. In any
event, if the "no orthodoxy" rule is refashioned along the lines Koppelman suggests, then state policy
directed to pushing religious doctrine toward the state's own not-expressly-religious orthodoxy does
not violate or undermine the rule.
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requires us to pretend ... that.., government cannot and therefore does
not prescribe--does not officially stand for-any 'right opinions.""" Of
course governments-even liberal, constitutional governments-"pre-
scribe" orthodoxy. Thomas Jefferson's quip about polytheistic pick-pockets
notwithstanding, even liberal, constitutional governments are not, and
cannot be, indifferent to "matters of opinion." Our government consciously
and purposely articulates positions, stakes claims, and take stands; it approves,
endorses, and subsidizes some controversial and contestable ideas, and rejects
others. Indeed, our government in particular was founded upon, and
dedicated to, certain ideas and propositions.2 7
Moving away from the Religion Clause for a moment, the Court has
confronted alleged efforts by government to revise the expression and orga-
nizing principles of groups in a number of contexts.2"8 In California Democratic
Party v. Jones,"°5 for example, the Court invalidated on First Amendment
grounds a "blanket primary" system that California had adopted by initiative.
Under that system-whose purpose was to encourage the nomination of more
"moderate", "centrist" candidates, and thereby to "improve" the tone of
California's elections and the substance of its politics-all registered voters,
regardless of party, could vote for any candidate, regardless of party. In other
words, anyone who wanted to was entitled by law to participate in selecting
the spokesperson, and therefore the message, of the Republican, Green, or
Peace and Freedom Party.210 Seven Justices agreed that the blanket primary
violated the Democratic Party's fundamental "rights of association. 21  As
Justice Scalia put it, the "blanket-primary" requirement "forces political
206. Smith, supra note 26, at 625-26; see also id. at 627. Smith states:
[T]he "no orthodoxy" position memorably articulated in Barnette has had a beguiling but
baneful influence on our First Amendment discourses-and hence on our understanding
of our community, and of ourselves.
Id.
207. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 101, at vii. Murray states:
In philosophy a proposition is the statement of a truth to be demonstrated. In mathematics
a proposition is at times the statement of an operation to be performed. Our Fathers
dedicated the nation to a proposition in both of these senses .... The American
Proposition presents itself as a coherent structure of thought that lays claim to intellectual
assent; it also presents itself as an organized political project that aims at historical success.
Id.
208. See generally Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the
Expression of Associations, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001).
209. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
210. See id. at 575 ("[lt is the nominee who becomes the party's ambassador to the general
electorate in winning it over to the party's views.").
211. Id. at 571; see also id. at 586 ("[T]he burden Proposition 198 [which created the blanket
primary] places on petitioners' rights of political association is both severe and unnecessary.").
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parties to associate with-to have their nominees, and hence their positions,
determined by-those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party,
and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival." '212 In his view, this "stark
repudiation of freedom of political association""2 ' was unjustified by any
compelling state interests and was supported by few valid ones. The blanket-
primary requirement, after all, "has the likely outcome-indeed ... the
intended outcome-of changing the parties' message."2"4 However, the Court
insisted, official unhappiness with or disapproval of an association's message,
or a preference for others, is an impermissible basis for restrictions on the
freedom of expressive association."'
The Court's controversial decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale1 6 is
in a similar vein. There, the Justices narrowly decided that New Jersey's
nondiscrimination law could not be applied in such a way as to require the
Boy Scouts to retain an openly gay scoutmaster. Both the precise holding
and the working rationale of Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion are
hard to pin down. Still, the case can fairly be read to endorse a theme set out
a few years earlier, and a bit more clearly, in the Hurley case. There, Justice
Souter insisted that the First Amendment does not permit government to
pursue its interest in a "society free of the [relevant] biases" by applying
antidiscrimination law, in a way that burdens associational freedoms, with
the objective of "produc[ing] speakers free of [those] biases.""21  In Justice
Souter's view:
[11f [producing unbiased speakers]... is the point of applying the state
law to expressive conduct, it is a decidedly fatal objective.... The very
idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce
thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all
people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less
than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.
The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis.
218
212. Id. at 577.
213. Id. at 582.
214. Id. at 581-82; see also id. at 587 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The true purpose of this
law ... is to force a political party ... to change the party's doctrinal position on major issues.").
215. Id. at 583 (disapproving laws whose only "object [is] simply to require speakers to modify
the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law[s] choose to alter it with
messages of their own" (quoting Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
578 (1995)); see also id. at 570 (noting that the blanket-primary initiative had been "[piromoted
largely as a measure that would 'weaken' party 'hard-liners' and ease the way for 'moderate problem-
solvers').
216. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
217. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578-79.
218. Id. at 579.
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Finally, it would not push the doctrine-reforming analogy too far to
mention the Court's relatively recent parental-rights case, Troxel v.
Granville"9 Although the Court was badly splintered, a clear majority
disapproved the state of Washington's unusually expansive third-party-visitation
law. The statute permitted "[any person" to petition for court-ordered
visitation of someone else's child "at any time," and authorized courts to
grant such a petition, over custodial parents' objection, whenever visitation
would serve the child's "best interest." ' Neither deference to parents'
objections, nor any showing that the visitation requested is necessary to
avoid harm to the child, was required. Insisting that "[plarents have a right
to limit visitation of their children with third persons"; that parents, not
judges, "should be the ones to choose whether to expose their children to
certain people or ideas"; and that it is not for the state "to make significant
decisions concerning the custody of children merely because it could make
a 'better' decision," the Washington high court had invalidated the
statute,22' and the Supreme Court affirmed."
As I have noted elsewhere, Troxel "re-affirms the prerogatives of fami-
lies to constitute themselves, and of parents to educate their children, in
accord with their values and beliefs, and thereby to communicate those values
and beliefs to the world, even when they are different from those preferred by the
state."23 Parents express themselves, to their children and to the world, when
they instruct, guide, discipline, and communicate with their children; families
express themselves, to their members and to the world, when they constitute
themselves and direct their activities in accord with certain aspirations. 4 As
Justice Souter noted in Troxel, decisions about things so prosaic as a child's
playmates are, at bottom, decisions about the child's "social and moral
character." '225 These parental decisions, which the Washington law permitted
courts to undo when they were not in accord with the courts' own "best
interests" assessments, can fairly be analogized to doctrinal claims that the
state might wish to help unsettle.
219. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
220. Id. at 60 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)).
221. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21,31 (Wash. 1998).
222. Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Constitution "does not permit a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state
judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 (plurality opinion).
223. Garnett, supra note 208, at 1878.
224. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.").
225. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Return now to the question whether government efforts to move and
direct developments in religious doctrine would run afoul of the basic
Religion Clause norm that the "government may not declare religious
truth. ' 26 Each of the three cases mentioned above involves, at some level, a
vindication by the Court of the claim that some state action has infringed on
the right of the state's norm-generating competitors-for example, a political
party, a youth group, a family-to structure and transmit its own message, or
"doctrine." Do these decisions also vindicate what was almost certainly our
initial reaction, that is, that governments like ours have no "secular interest,"
and therefore may not meddle, in the "development of doctrine"?
I do not think so. Dale does not teach that governments lack a valid
"interest" in what the Boy Scouts teach and say with respect to sexual
morality; Jones does not hold that governments lack such an interest in the
vibrancy, or lack thereof, of political debate; and Troxel does not stand for a
rule that governments ought not to concern themselves with what parents
teach to their children. What these cases do teach--correctly, in my view-
is that the government's interests in these matters are insufficiently weighty
to justify the burdens that particular means of pursuing those interests impose
on constitutionally protected freedoms. By the same token, Hull Church is
rightly decided, and some government actions touching upon or affecting
religious doctrine are unconstitutional, but not because the state lacks any
interest in that doctrine, or is prohibited by the Constitution from trying to
move and shape it.
In sum, the relevant case law seems consonant with Justice Brennan's
concern for the "free development of doctrine" and also with a commitment
to the autonomy of religious and other mediating associations. This is as it
should be.227 At the same time, as was outlined earlier, it is evident that
government shapes religious doctrine and influences its development often
and in many ways. This is true not only because it could hardly be other-
wise, but also because-courts' protestations to the contrary notwith-
standing-liberal governments like ours have an "interest" in the content
of associations' messages, in the views of political parties' nominees, in the
views and attitudes parents impart to their children, and in the "devel-
opment of doctrine" in religious communities.228
226. Koppelman, supra note 74, at 89; see also id. at 108 (observing that it is an
"Establishment Clause [a]xiom" that the Clause "forbids the state from declaring religious truth").
227. See generally Garnett, supra note 208.
228. The term "state interest" is a public-law term of art. In this sense, an "interest" is the "rational
basis," "substantial interest," or "compelling interest" that is required under many of the balancing tests
employed by courts in individual-rights cases. Here, I am making the more straightforward descriptive
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V. COMPETING LOYALTIES: EXPLORING THE STATE'S INTEREST
IN DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
A closer examination of this "interest" might start with a basic propo-
sition: We invariably care, and so our governments care too, what and in
what our fellow citizens believe. We think that it matters what they value
and that it matters to and for what they aspire. We care what our fellows are
taught; it matters to us how and by whom they are formed."9 We care,
therefore, what religions teach; we care about doctrine. Claims to the con-
trary, even when couched in the compelling language of pluralism and
limited government, are at best disingenuous.
To be sure, we might very well decide, and for very good reasons, to
refrain from trying-and to constrain our governments from trying-to
control too closely the commitments and values of others. Although we care
about these values, and about who transmits them, we might nonetheless
elect to assume the risks that inhere in a free, pluralistic, democratic
society,23 ° keeping in mind Judge McConnell's claim that "it is difficult or
impossible for a liberal state to engage in the direct inculcation of public
virtue without compromising its liberal commitment to neutrality among the
different and competing reasonable worldviews of the society."2 ' We might
doubt governments' ability to engage effectively in "direct inculcation of
public virtue," particularly via means as seemingly treacherous to religious
freedom as policies directed at the content of religious doctrine.
Notwithstanding our secular interest in the substance and development of such
doctrine, we could easily and wisely decide that the risks are too great. Such a
decision, though, would not transform the government's interest into an
"ecclesiastical" one. It would not mean that we did not care about the
point that any government, including a liberal one like ours, is committed to certain goals and
values, and therefore has an "interest" in supporting and securing conditions that make its aims more
attainable.
229. A century ago, the mathematician W.K. Clifford, responding to the claim that "there may
be no harm done by the mere belief" in unsupported conclusions, insisted that doing so is a "great
wrong towards Man," because one who does so "make[s] [himself] credulous." He also said, "[t]he
danger to society is not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but
that it should become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for
then it must sink back into savagery." W.K. CLIFFORD, The Ethics of Belief, in THE ETHICS OF BELIEF
AND OTHER ESSAYS 70, 76 (1999).
230. See Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453,
457-58 (2000) (observing that "a liberal society is always at risk" and is "vulnerable at its
foundations"); see also STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 278-79 (2000) ("We should not take for granted a shared civic life
robust enough to master the many centrifugal forces to which modem life gives rise.").
231. McConnell, supra note 230, at 455. In my view, this is the better course.
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development and substance of doctrine, only that we cared about religious
freedom more.
That said, there is increasing disagreement, contra McConnell, about the
"difficult[y]" of "the direct inculcation of public virtue," and also about just
how fundamental to liberalism "neutrality" really is. In fact, the trend among
liberal political theorists seems to be toward "thicker," more perfectionist
notions of democracy. It seems to be to acknowledge, and also to insist, that
the health of democratic societies depends crucially on the character,
dispositions, habits, and premises of their citizens. We appear to be entering
what Professor Smith might call a "fourth stage of liberalism," and emerging
from the "[]iberalism of [n]eutrality and [e]quality," which "eschews not only
repression but also the very notion of an official orthodoxy." ' This civic-
virtues brand of liberalism, while generally not "repressi[ve]," is nonetheless
aggressive, and perhaps more confident, in endorsing and attempting to
inculcate its orthodoxy.
Most know the story about Benjamin Franklin being asked by a Phila-
delphia woman during the Constitutional Convention, "Well Doctor what
have we got?," and Franklin responding, "A republic.., if you can keep it." '233
Similarly, many contemporary theorists believe that one of the things that
must be done to "keep" a liberal democracy is to quite self-consciously create
liberal democrats.' In Amy Gutmann's words, "[c]onscious social repro-
duction," or citizen creation, is thought by many to be a requirement for
deliberative democracy.235 After all, citizens capable of self-government,
disposed toward tolerance, and comfortable with (not merely resigned to)
pluralism do not just happen. "Liberal democratic citizens are made, not
born,"'236 insist the fourth-stage theorists, and we cannot take for granted the
cultural conditions of democracy and self-government.23  Even liberal
232. Smith, supra note 32, at 308, 311. Professor Smith would probably contend that "third
stage" liberalism actually does embrace "orthodoxy," and that the proposed "fourth stage" is simply
the "third stage" unmasked. Id.
233. See 3 THEREORDSOFTHE FEDERAL CONvEnTON OF 1787, at 85 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
234. Cf. William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three
Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 869, 872 (1999) ("Within the civic republican
tradition, state intrusion to foster good citizens poses no threshold issues; not so for liberal democracy,
whose core commitments place limits on the measures the state legitimately may employ.").
235. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 39 (1987) ("We are committed to
collectively re-creating the society that we share .... The substance of this core commitment is
conscious social reproduction.").
236. Galston, supra note 234, at 870.
237. See MACEDO, supra note 230, at 279 ("Our good fortune in having developed institutions
that foster... shared civic values must neither lull us into complacency nor encourage reforms that
rashly overlook the advantages of the system we have.").
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societies, which aspire to tolerance and neutrality, must inculcate values and
promote contested views of the good if they hope to thrive and survive."' A
society that aspires to meaningful democracy must take care that it produces
citizens capable of valuing and achieving that end. 9
Our ongoing conversations about "civic education," religious freedom,
and political liberalism proceed in accord with these general observations."4
It is argued, for example, that the education of young people is both the
liberal state's obligation and its particular prerogative, and that its purpose
must include the inculcation of government-approved dispositions, atti-
tudes, and beliefs.241 Henry Adams would have reluctantly agreed: He once
wrote-or, more precisely, he complained-that education is "a sort of
dynamo machine for polarizing the popular mind; for turning and holding
its lines of force in the direction supposed to be the most effective for State
purposes." '242 Similarly, our Supreme Court has noted approvingly that the
objective of public education is the "inculcation" of 'fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."'' ' The poet
238. See Smith, supra note 26, at 659 (noting that even "[piroponents of a 'no orthodoxy'
position occasionally acknowledge that in some situations, government cannot avoid endorsing
some beliefs and rejecting others").
239. See GUTMANN, supra note 235, at 39 ("[A] society that supports conscious social
reproduction must educate all educable children to be capable of participating in collectively
shaping their society.").
240. There is a rich and growing scholarly literature on "civic education," and on the challenges
to certain conceptions of political liberalism posed by religious faith, teachings, and communities. See,
e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); GUTMANN, supra note
235; STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION,
AND LOYALTY 35 (1998); MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION (1999);
MACEDO, supra note 230; MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY (D. Ravitch &
J. Viteritti eds., 2001); MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION (Nomos XLIII et al. eds., 2002); William
A. Galston, Civic Education in the Liberal State, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE (N. Rosenblum
ed., 1989); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937
(1996); Michael W. McConnell, Multculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does
Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123; see also Richard W. Garnett,
Regulatory Strings and Religious Freedom: Requiring Private Schools to Promote Public Values, in EDUCATING
CITIZENS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIC VALUES AND SCHOOL CHOICE (S. Macedo et al.
eds.) (forthcoming 2004).
241. For a different view, see, for example, Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About
School Choice: Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281
(2002); Gamett, supra note 208.
242. THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 78 (Modem Library ed., 1996).
243. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); see also Sch. Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan stated:
It is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the public
schools serve a uniquely public function [sic]: the training of American citizens in an
atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort-an
was right, then: The hand that rocks the cradle rules the world.244 Those
who decide what children may and should learn thereby shape those chil-
dren's character and commitments as well as, by extension, those of the
community. Accordingly, Professor Macedo argues that a "more judg-
mental liberalism" is needed, one that is wary of and aggressive in opposing
"religious enthusiasm" and that uses not only the public schools, but "all of
the instruments of public policy," to "shape [the] social norms and meanings
that mold individual choices and character." '245
One need not be a Jacobin to agree that the health of civil society
depends crucially on the formation, development, and training of capable,
decent, other-regarding persons who are concerned with and motivated by
the common good. After all, a democratic political community can no more
perpetuate itself without attending carefully to the dispositions of its citizens
than a religious community that does not evangelize each new generation can
hope to thrive and survive. The question remains, of course, whether the
perceived fragility of democratic values and the obvious role of education in
producing and promoting those values require, or even justify, the regulatory
particulars of the civic-education agenda.
In any event, today's "thicker" versions of liberal theory, the civic-
education agenda, and the political needs to which that agenda is a proposed
response support the claim that the liberal state is not and cannot be
indifferent to the substantive content of the messages and teachings that
shape those who would be liberal citizens.246 If religious doctrine plays a role
in the formation of citizens, then it must be of interest to liberal govern-
ments.
Professor Smith's critical reflection on Justice Jackson's "fixed star"
proclamation is instructive.242 Smith argues that one reason for skepticism
toward Jackson's assertion that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox" '248 is that the claim "has not been-and indeed could not
atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American groups
and religions.
Id.
244. See WILLIAM Ross WALLACE, THE HAND THAT ROCKS THE CRADLE IS THE HAND
THAT RULES THE WORLD. Wallace, who wrote this poem around 1865, was a lawyer.
245. MACEDO, supra note 230, at 276-78; see also id. at ix (noting that public schools are
"instruments for the most basic and controversial of civic ends[,]... [tIhe project of creating citizens").
246. See Smith, supra note 26, at 637 (noting that "the most obvious and pervasive
prescription of belief occurs in... public schools").
247. Id.
248. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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be--consistently implemented." '249  In fact, Smith observes, "the American
Proposition" "rests" precisely "on the conviction that there are truths; that they
can be known; that they must be held; for if they are not held,... there can be
no hope of founding a true City, in which men may dwell in dignity, peace,
unity, justice, well-being, freedom.""25 Smith also suggests that, even if it were
possible for government to "carry on its business without ever expressing its
official support for one set of controversial beliefs over others,"2 ' it is not clear
that such a government could hope to attract and sustain the allegiance of real
people, who are more than mere interest-seekers and who need naturally to
believe. "[A] community that neglects or ignores this dimension of our
personhood"-by, for example, either pretending not to stand or in fact not
standing for anything-will have at best a weak claim on our respect." '252
It does not necessarily follow from Smith's observation that governments
do or should strive to "stand[] for" things, or to support some beliefs or others,
to the point of actively seeking to bring about revisions in those things for
which other communities, including religious communities, stand. Still,
Smith's observations about what governments cannot help doing, and also
about what they should do if they hope to inspire the engagement and enjoy
the support of real people, shore up the claim that decent, liberal governments
have an "interest" in what people believe and, therefore, in the content of
religious teaching.
Professor Smith's concern about the ability of a "truth-coy strain of modem
liberalism" to serve as the basis for political community and to inspire the
"allegiance necessary to a secure government"'25 dovetails nicely with another
interesting and helpful line of argument. Professor Carter's 1995 Massey Lectures
provide, among other things, a meditation on the often competing demands of
"loyalty" made by the state and civil society's various mediating associations,
including religious communities, and on the state's efforts to instill such loyalty
via education and other means.' It is important to recognize, Carter says, that
249. Smith, supra note 26, at 632; see also id. at 636 ("[Tihe anti-orthodoxy principle asks
the impossible, because government inevitably will endorse and in that sense prescribe some
beliefs, and will explicitly or tacitly disapprove of other beliefs.").
250. Id. at 639 (quoting MURRAY, supra note 101, at ix).
251. Id. at 640.
252. Id. at 641. Professor Smith has elaborated elsewhere his belief-centered moral
anthropology. Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The Neglected Center of the
First Amendment, 25 U. ILL. L. REv. 1233 (2002).
253. Smith, supra note 26, at 640-41.
254. CARTER, supra note 240; see also id. at 27 (noting the "potentially subversive" nature of religious
communities, "for the meanings that they discover and assign to the world may be radically distinct from
those that are assigned by the political sovereign"); id. at 29-30 ("[Rieligion[s] ... demand forms of
allegiance and thus of loyalty."); id. at 79 (referring to the state's "competing instruction").
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religious communities seek to "project into the future"-via worship,
activism, and doctrine-"an understanding of the world that may be quite
different from that of the sovereign majority of ... citizens. ''25 5  "Religions
matter," he insists, precisely because their sometimes dissenting
understandings affect how and what citizens think about difficult moral and
political issues. 56 And that they "demand forms of allegiance and thus of
loyalty" is why the content of their claims can pose an obstacle to what
Carter calls the "project of liberal constitutionalism," which includes an effort
to "create[] a single, nationwide community with shared values and shared,
enforceable understandings of how local communities of all descriptions
should be organized." '257
These questions of loyalty, formation, and competition arise not only in
the dialogue between religion and government-though they are most
pressing in that context-but also and more generally in the state's rela-
tionship with the mediating associations of civil society. Not surprisingly,
then, state action that targets the mission or message of "expressive" and
other associations has received careful attention recently in the Court. These
associations often "serve as vehicles for concerted activity by individuals, and
for amplified expression to governments and to the world. They also, like
governments, express and transmit messages of their own. We are shaped by
mediating associations, even as we shape our world through them." '258 This is
one reason why the liberal state and the intermediate associations of civil
society will often compete for the opportunity to educate, and thereby to
impart loyalties, inculcate values, and shape character."9 And the interest of
liberal governments in the values, expression, and doctrine of associations
seems particularly strong in the case of religious communities. While it is
probably a mistake to reduce religions and faith traditions to voluntary
255. Id. at 141; see also id. at 30 ("[A] principal purpose of religious narrative and religious
observance is to preserve the tradition of the past and project it into the future."); id. at 27 ("[T]he
meanings that they discover and assign to the world may be radically distinct from those that are
assigned by the political sovereign.").
256. Id. at 30.
257. Id. at 19, 29-30; see also MURRAY, supra note 101, at ix-x ("The question is sometimes
raised, whether Catholicism is compatible with American democracy. The question is invalid as
well as impertinent; for the manner of its position inverts the order of values. It must, of course,
be turned round to read, whether American democracy is compatible with Catholicism.").
258. Garnett, supra note 15, at 801.
259. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit
Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 428-30 (2000) (arguing that the
liberal state's "aim should be to promote a certain structure of groups and associations" and insisting
that "the crucial thing is to foster memberships that are not tribalistic but pluralistic").
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associations, it seems clear-as Professor Carter has suggested-that what
associations generally do, religious communities do particularly well.
Thus, liberal governments do have a "secular" interest in the substantive
content of religious institutions' expression, teachings, and doctrine, and the
"development" of doctrine is, in fact, a matter of more than ecclesiastical
concern. However-and this is the crucial point-this does not mean that
constitutional law should not constrain governments' efforts to pursue this
interest, or that such efforts pose no threat to religious freedom, or even that
the meaning of a "secular" interest is obvious.26 It is only to acknowledge
what the Court in Hull Church now appears to have skipped past too quickly,
namely, that the state's interest is, from its own perspective, real and
compelling, and also that governments do and invariably will try-through
regulation, spending, expression, adjudication, and so on-to advance it.
26'
I cannot emphasize enough that the conclusion toward which this line of
argument points is not that Hull Church was wrongly decided, or that the state's
perceived social-reproduction and virtue-inculcation needs are normatively
prior either to the integrity of religious traditions or to the expressive autonomy
of mediating associations. Governments ought to steer clear of doctrinal
disputes and ought to avoid excessive entanglement with the structure,
governance, and teaching of religions. This is not, however, because religious
doctrine does not matter to government, or to public life, but because
religious freedom does matter. It matters in itself, because of what it is, and not
merely because it is the logical implication of a policy of government
"neutrality" or non-"cognizance." As John Courmey Murray once put it, at the
very heart of our notion of "freedom of religion" is the claim that "churches"
have the "freedom... to maintain their own different identities, as defined by
themselves." Murray also stated: "[E]very church claims this freedom to define
itself, and claims too the consequent right to reject definition at the hands of
any secular authority., 62 The concern that inspired this Article, however, is
that breezy assertions denying any secular "interest" in shaping religion-like
assurances that our government "must be neutral in matters of religious
theory, doctrine, and practice ' 263 and that "religion must be a private matter
for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice" 2 -will
260. See Smith, supra note 196.
261. See Macedo, supra note 259, at 418 (noting approvingly that the "flow of public
monies" will mean that "some religious institutions and communities will have to compromise
their spiritual mission" and "conform to public values").
262. MURRAY, supra note 101, at xi.
263. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
264. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
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in the end prove a poor defense against the inevitable efforts by the
government to pursue its interest.
CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan got it right, then, but he was also quite wrong: Secu-
lar, liberal, and democratic governments do, or at least could, find it in their
interest to cause changes not only in what religious believers profess and
how they behave, but also in what religious communities teach, praise,
condemn, and require. These are not, in fact, "matters of purely ecclesi-
astical concern."
This Article's aim has been to provide a "point of entry" into our rich
and ongoing conversations about commitment and toleration, about the
claims of the state and the claims of faith, about integrity and integration,
and about our aspirations to unity and the reality of division. The point of
this examination of one sentence taken from a relatively uncontroversial
Supreme Court opinion is not to level accusations of disingenuousness or
dishonesty. Instead, it is to offer a reminder that liberal, democratic
governments like ours necessarily care what their citizens believe, and
therefore will invariably seek to shape the content of citizens' beliefs through
government speech and other means, including regulation, subsidization, and
criminalization. The state does this not simply for the sake of self-expression, but
in order to form and change the minds of those to whom it speaks. A speaker
hoping to change listeners' minds is not indifferent to the message of her
competitors. A sober awareness of this fact is a better defense for the freedom of
religion than marginalizing and misleading assurances of the government's lack of
interest.
This Symposium was convened to examine, in a number of contexts,
difficult questions concerning assimilation, toleration, and pluralism.
"Assimilation," remember, is a complicated concept. Our dictionaries remind
us that "assimilate" can serve as both a transitive and an intransitive verb; it
265. See Chopko, supra note 169, at 147 ("The question is whether, in pursuit of
government-defined orthodoxy, the government has the right and the power to remake, or
suppress, the religiously and philosophically diverse institutions created by our pluralistic
citizenry."); see also Jacob T. Levy, Liberal Jacobinism, 114 ETHICS 318, 324 (2004) (reviewing
BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY (2002)) ("Because states have an ongoing drive to
create a shared national identity among their citizens, and because states have at their disposal the
tools that they do, we need to worry on an ongoing basis that they will pursue violent, unjust
projects of assimilation.").
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is something that we do, and also something that is done to us.' 6 To
"assimilate" is to "become like" or to "conform to"; it is also to "make like" or
"cause to resemble." An immigrant might well choose, as so many immigrants
to the United States have done, to "assimilate" to the habits, tastes, and culture
of her new home; it is also the case that, in any event and in many ways, the
United States will "assimilate" her. As we have seen, religious believers and
religion itself have both assimilated to, and been assimilated by, American
culture. This Article is an effort to call attention to another, more specific,
assimilation story, namely, liberal governments' attempts and ambition to
assimilate religious commitments, ideals, and doctrine to their own.
266. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 111-
12 (3d ed. 1992).
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